Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects a high volume of successful network connections to common web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443) where the remote URL contains keywords like 'version' or 'software'. This pattern could indicate an adversary performing reconnaissance to identify installed software and their versions, potentially looking for vulnerabilities or specific applications to target. The threshold of 10 such activities within an hour for a single device is set to flag anomalous behavior.
Detects devices making a high volume (5 or more per hour) of successful network connections to remote URLs containing 'update' or 'patch' on port 443 (HTTPS). This could indicate legitimate system updates, but also potentially malicious update checks or beaconing activity.
This rule detects a high volume of network connection retries (more than 500 within a one-minute window) to a distinct remote IP address. This behavior can be indicative of a network denial-of-service (DoS) attack, where an attacker attempts to overwhelm a target by repeatedly trying to establish connections.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe executes with missing or minimal DLL arguments and subsequently establishes outbound network connections. This behavior is uncommon in legitimate Windows operations and has been observed during ACR Stealer infections, including executions originating from remote SMB shares and memory-loaded payloads.
This rule detects PowerShell execution that combines 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'Invoke-RestMethod' with 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) or 'Invoke-Expression'. This pattern is commonly used as a download cradle to fetch and execute malicious scripts or stage-2 infostealers, as observed in campaigns like the fake Gemini CLI installation script.
Detects outbound network traffic to a hardcoded Command and Control (C2) IP address and port associated with a specific build of Lucid Stealer malware. This rule identifies potential C2 communication by monitoring network connections for a known malicious IP and port combination.
This rule detects outbound network connections from devices to IP addresses identified as malicious by a threat intelligence feed. It joins device network events with threat intelligence indicators, specifically looking for successful connections or connection requests to IPs with a confidence score greater than 50. The alert provides details about the device, the remote IP, the initiating process, and the threat intelligence context.
Detects DNS requests to the specific Azure Blob Storage subdomain used by the Azureveil Adaptix agent in Operation Dragon Weave as a dead-drop command and control server.
This rule detects outbound TCP connections on port 9050, which is commonly used by the Tor anonymity network. The rule is configured to trigger an alert if there are at least 3 such connections from the same source within a 60-second window, indicating potential use of Tor. The message suggests this activity is related to accessing an Initial Access Broker market.
This rule detects HTTP requests to known dedicated server rental providers (ovh.com, leaseweb.com, servermania.com) where the URI contains the word 'order'. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to rent infrastructure for attack purposes, such as command and control servers, phishing sites, or other malicious operations.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication originating from a compromised serverless function. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests with a body size greater than 500 bytes, targeting domains associated with serverless platforms like Vercel (.vercel.app), Netlify (.netlify.app), and Cloudflare Pages (.pages.dev). A threshold of 10 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating a possible high-volume data exfiltration or C2 activity.
This rule detects attempts to purchase code signing certificates by monitoring HTTP traffic for connections to known certificate authorities (Sectigo, Comodo, Digicert) and the presence of the term 'codesigning' in the URI. This could indicate an adversary attempting to acquire legitimate code signing certificates for malicious purposes, such as signing malware to evade detection.
This rule detects outbound TCP connections from any source to the local network ($HOME_NET) on port 9150. This port is commonly used by Tor Browser for its SOCKS proxy, indicating potential use of Tor for anonymization or to bypass network restrictions. The rule specifically looks for the SYN flag in the TCP handshake, signifying the initiation of a connection.
This rule detects outbound TCP connections from any source to the local network ($HOME_NET) on port 9050, specifically looking for the SYN flag. Port 9050 is commonly associated with Tor SOCKS proxy services. This activity is classified as a policy violation and is linked to the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1090.003, which involves using a Tor proxy for defense evasion.
This rule detects the use of an external proxy service to mask Command and Control (C2) origin. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the 'X-Forwarded-For' header is present and the HTTP method is 'CONNECT'. A threshold of 10 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source IP is applied to reduce false positives.
This rule detects a potential FTP C2 (Command and Control) channel exhibiting a regular beaconing pattern. It triggers an alert if 10 or more TCP connections are made to port 21 (FTP) from a single source IP address within a 300-second window, indicating established communication from the internal network to an external FTP server. This behavior is characteristic of malware using FTP for C2 communications.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header contains "MSHTML", indicating potential remote script execution via Mshta. Mshta.exe is a Microsoft utility that can execute HTML Application (HTA) files, which can contain scripts. Attackers often abuse Mshta to execute malicious scripts, bypassing traditional execution policies. The rule specifically looks for outbound HTTP connections from the internal network ($HOME_NET) to any external destination, where the User-Agent string includes "MSHTML" (case-insensitive). This behavior is commonly associated with trojan activity and defense evasion tactics.
Identifies active Command and Control communication from infected hosts to known Red Lamassu infrastructure by monitoring network connections to specific C2 domains.
Detects network connections originating from the Vulkan loader executable (vulkaninfo.exe) over port 1234, indicative of RomulusLoader C2 activity associated with TA4922.
This rule detects processes making a high volume of network connections (10 or more within an hour) to URLs containing 'release' or 'download'. This behavior can be indicative of malware downloading additional components, updates, or exfiltrating data, but could also be legitimate software updates or large file transfers.
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