Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Adobe Reader initiating unexpected network connections, which may indicate an exploit fetching a secondary payload or communicating with a C2 server.
Monitors for the specific URL pattern used by the PhantomPull loader to fetch the final PhantomPulse payload via WinHTTP. This behavior is associated with the REF6598 campaign.
Detects network connections to Masjesu's hardcoded fallback command and control IP addresses over port 443. This rule is critical for detecting mature infections where Masjesu actively falls back to a set of hardcoded IP addresses if domain resolution fails.
Detects DNS requests directed to the cloudapi[.]stream domain, which is associated with a widespread malicious Chrome extension campaign involving over 100 extensions. Monitoring for this specific domain allows defenders to identify compromised hosts regardless of the specific extension ID.
Detects HTTP requests containing the VS/PL/AN parameter combination used by JanelaRAT for C2 beaconing. The beacon reports malware version (VS), profile level (PL), and presence of banking security software (AN). JanelaRAT targets Latin American financial institutions (Brazil, Mexico). Note: C2 uses port 443 WITHOUT TLS encryption.
Provides high-fidelity detection of the initial infrastructure used by the threat actor to deliver the PhantomPulse RAT. This rule specifically detects network connections to a known PhantomPulse staging server IP address.
This rule detects outbound network connections from Adobe Reader (AcroRd32.exe) or Adobe Acrobat (Acrobat.exe) processes on Windows platforms to known malicious C2 IP addresses. This activity is indicative of potential compromise, likely stemming from an exploit targeting Adobe products, as observed in a sophisticated zero-day campaign.
Detects unusual outbound network connections from ATM devices (identified by device names containing 'ATM', 'NCR', 'DIEBOLD', 'WINCOR'). The rule flags connections to public IP addresses, excluding common internal networks and standard web/DNS ports (80, 443, 53). Alerts are triggered if an ATM device shows a high number of connections, unique remote IPs, or significant data transfer, indicating potential compromise or unauthorized activity.
Detects PowerShell execution that interacts with GitHub API or raw content endpoints and includes a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) in the command line. This combination can indicate malicious activity such as data exfiltration, code deployment, or C2 communication, especially if originating from an unexpected host or user.
This rule detects DNS resolution requests to specific malicious command and control (C2) domains, 'sfrclak.com' and 'callnrwise.com', which have been linked to the 'Axios attack'. Detection of these domains indicates potential compromise and active C2 communication.
Detects cleartext network connections using FTP (port 21) or Telnet (port 23) to external IP addresses. This rule specifically filters out internal RFC1918 traffic to focus on public-facing cleartext communications, addressing compliance requirements such as PCI-DSS for strong cryptography over public networks.
Detects network connections initiated by regsvr32.exe or cmstp.exe to external IP addresses on common web ports. This behavior can indicate the use of these legitimate Windows utilities for malicious purposes, such as downloading and executing malicious scripts or DLLs, often bypassing application whitelisting.
This rule detects network connections from devices to known malicious infrastructure, specifically the domain 'sfrclak.com' or the IP address '142.11.206.73'. These indicators are associated with potential compromise or command and control activity.
This rule detects the multi-stage installation and command-and-control (C2) activities associated with GhostClaw or GhostLoader malware on macOS systems. It correlates suspicious process executions, such as curl-based bootstrap, install.sh execution, user-space Node.js setup, and outbound network traffic to 'trackpipe.dev' with UUID-like pathing or specific NODE_CHANNEL values. The rule looks for a combination of at least three of these indicators within a two-hour window to reduce false positives.
This rule detects outbound network connections to the domain 'trackpipe.dev', which is associated with the GhostClaw/GhostLoader macOS malware. It specifically looks for UUID-like identifiers in the URL path, indicating per-repository communication patterns used by the malware.
Detects network connections to known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure associated with the compromised axios NPM package, which was found to drop a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The rule specifically looks for connections to the IP address 142.11.206.73 or DNS queries for 'sfrclak.com'.
Detects instances where dllhost.exe initiates outbound network connections to public IP addresses. Legitimate dllhost.exe processes rarely need to communicate with the internet. Such connections could indicate compromise through COM object hijacking, process hollowing, or injected code attempting to establish command and control (C2) communication.
This detection rule identifies network traffic associated with the Powercat malware campaign by looking for specific URL patterns or domains mentioned in threat intelligence. It focuses on high-confidence indicators such as 'powercat.dog/(cool|watermelon5)' or 'ce953a0eb08246617b7f849486c4b26a7af37e9d2e8f0e13b3ae1bf0da8a70a.xyz' within network proxy, traffic, or HTTP logs. A match indicates potential communication with Powercat command and control infrastructure or distribution points, warranting further investigation into the source and destination IPs, URLs, and surrounding network activity.
This rule detects DNS requests to the domain 'cloud.es.io'. This domain is associated with Elastic Cloud, and unusual traffic to it could indicate potential data exfiltration, command and control activity, or unauthorized access to Elastic Cloud resources. The rule specifically looks for the 'DnsRequest' event type in raw Falcon data and filters for the specified domain name, then outputs relevant host and network information.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of the Albabat malware. It looks for instances where a device performs WMI-based reconnaissance (querying CPU, csproduct, OS, or NIC information) followed by or preceded by network communication with either a GitHub repository containing 'billdev' or a Supabase instance. The time window for these events is set to 30 minutes, suggesting a contextual link between the reconnaissance and subsequent network activity.
Detects `curl` commands performing `POST` requests with `--data-binary` that are spawned from a process whose command line contains "trivy-action". This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration in the context of a compromised Trivy supply chain.
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