Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when a known 'benign' binary, as identified by the Google Cloud Threat Intelligence (GCTI) Feed, initiates an outbound network connection to an IP address identified as a Tor exit node, also from the GCTI Feed. The rule also increases the risk score if the Tor exit node is located in specific high-risk countries (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria). This indicates potential malicious activity where an otherwise legitimate program might be compromised or used for covert communication.
This rule detects HTTP web access to domains that exhibit low prevalence within the monitored environment. It specifically filters out internal RFC 1918 IP addresses and ensures that only valid Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) are considered. The prevalence is determined by a rolling maximum count of unique days a domain has been observed, with alerts triggering for domains seen 3 or fewer times. The risk score is incremented based on how low the prevalence is, with the lowest prevalence (1 day) resulting in the highest risk score.
This rule detects outbound network connections to IP addresses that are identified as Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) within a threat intelligence platform, specifically MISP. It filters out connections to RFC1918 private IP ranges to reduce false positives. The rule correlates network connection events with ingested MISP data to identify malicious communication.
Find web Traffic going to port 53
Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
Detects network web access to a low prevalence domain
Alert on downloading a known file hash from a known IP with VT Relationships.
Detects a process setting the RunOnce registry key and making suspicious network connections associated with DarkCloud Stealer.
IOC IP Target
YARA-L
Detect network events that indicate communication to a watchlisted IP address
Detect network connection to an ip address that was only seen for the first time in the past 24 hours
Alert on known Hash querying a known hostname with VT Relationships
Alert on downloading a known file hash from a known IP with VT Relationships.
Example usage of WHOIS data, detecting an executable file download from a domain that's recently expired
Executable downloaded by Microsoft Excel by user with GCP entity relationship
GCTI Tor Exit Nodes
YARA-L
Alert traffic destined for known Tor exit nodes
Alert on known Hash contacting Tor IP with VT Relationships.
This analytic detects Lumma Stealer outbound connection attempts using Cisco Secure Firewall Intrusion Events. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense IntrusionEvent logs to identify cases where Snort signatures with specific IDs have been triggered. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an active infection of Lumma Stealer.
Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port (88) indicating possible lateral movement or initial privilege escalation through delegation. The rule specifically filters out common legitimate processes like LSASS, Chrome, Firefox, and Tomcat that might generate similar network activity, aiming to reduce false positives.
Alert on Benign Binary contacting a TOR IP
A malicious file contacting a known Tor Exit Node.
IP Target Prevalence
YARA-L
Detect events that are communicating to IP addresses that have a low rolling max prevalence.
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