Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized data staging activities using archival utilities followed by data exfiltration to known public cloud storage providers. The rule specifically excludes hosts experiencing mass file renaming activity, focusing on extortion-only scenarios where data is stolen without encryption.
Detects potential browser-based infostealer activity where a non-standard process, launched from temporary or user-download directories, accesses sensitive browser data files (cookies, login data) followed by a suspicious outbound network connection to a previously unseen domain, matching common patterns for LummaStealer or Vidar malware.
Detects host-based reconnaissance activity involving system, network, and security software enumeration using standard administrative tools (e.g., PowerShell, WMI, netsh) that is followed by an outbound network connection to a known or suspicious implant check-in endpoint within a 30-minute window.
Detects instances where the XMRig cryptominer is masquerading as the legitimate systemd-logind process on Linux hosts. The rule triggers on process execution of /usr/sbin/systemd-logind coupled with suspicious outbound network connections to known mining pools or mining-related ports.
Detects malicious AI assistant links delivered via spearphishing emails that contain pre-populated prompt injection query parameters. The rule correlates the clicking of a high-signal URL (containing parameters like prompt, system, or lengthy search queries with malicious keywords) originating from an email with a subsequent active session to the same AI service within 5 minutes, confirming potential weaponized AI assistant session manipulation. Covers T1566.002, T1204.001
Detects the CLOSEDQUORUM implant communicating with multiple LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, or Gemini) for quorum-based decision making, followed by the same process spawning or injecting into a legitimate Windows system process (e.g., svchost, explorer) to conduct post-exploitation activities.
Detects anomalous DNS activity characterized by high-frequency IP address rotation for a single domain within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of fast-flux DNS techniques used by attackers to maintain C2 infrastructure and evade domain-based blocking or IP reputation filtering.
Detects unauthorized, unsigned processes accessing sensitive browser files (Cookies, Login Data, Local State) across common browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Firefox) followed by an outbound network connection. This behavior is indicative of credential-harvesting infostealer malware.
Detects outbound connections to a known malicious C2 infrastructure associated with the CARBONATO threat actor. The rule identifies both established SSH sessions using the OpenSSH implementation and the initiation of outbound TCP connections on ports dynamically determined by an MD5 hash, which is a known behavior of this actor's C2 communication strategy.
This rule monitors for suspicious interactions with Android device drivers via the 'getevent' utility, often used to capture raw input, combined with unusual file access patterns involving 'locateValues.json' and potential data exfiltration attempts to specific internal API endpoints.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware agent, including C2 tasking, Go agent 'frpc' tunnel configuration retrieval, tunnel deployment status reporting, and internal loopback C2 server communication.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically identifying C2 data exfiltration API calls over FRP (FRP/Go Agent) tunnels and WebSocket handshake traffic for command-and-control communication.
Detects malicious staging and C2 activity characteristic of RatHat Android malware. The rule identifies processes running under the Android shell user (UID 2000) that execute specific tools (minicap, minitouch, or disguised libraries) from the /data/local/tmp directory, followed by an outbound network connection, which is indicative of a persistence mechanism and reverse-tunneling command-and-control communication.
Detects HTTP traffic from the Psychedelic Stealer malware as it exfiltrates stolen browser passwords and session tokens to a specific command-and-control endpoint, and identifies the staging of Chromium Web Data files ('wd_tmp.db') within HTTP POST requests.
Detects outbound network traffic to known public BNB Smart Chain (BSC) data seed nodes using JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods or TLS connections. This pattern is indicative of malware using blockchain infrastructure as a dead drop resolver for C2 command retrieval or configuration updates.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain where an AI-agent's configuration file (e.g., mcp.json) is modified, followed immediately by the execution of a tool process (node/python) spawned by the agent, the subsequent spawning of a shell process, and finally an outbound network connection to a rare, non-standard domain. This sequence is indicative of AI agent tool poisoning, where malicious tool definitions are introduced to execute arbitrary commands and exfiltrate data. Coverts T1195.002, T1565.001, T1059
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to connect to known infrastructure associated with the VPN-for-X extension, which has been observed acting as a fallback proxy. The rule alerts on specific TLS SNI strings (de8.staticvaultcdn.org, de4.servefaststatic.work, de34.rapidstaticserve.cc) commonly leveraged by this infrastructure.
FileFix loader chains abuse trusted code-hosting platforms like Bitbucket/GitHub to host staged payload components, exploiting domain trust to evade network detection.
Detects HTTP(S) requests to known SideCopy/ReverseRAT payload-delivery URLs identified in Operation SideCopy spear-phishing campaigns targeting Indian academia.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
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