Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic containing the hardcoded user-agent string 'Remcos', which is indicative of a Remcos RAT beacon communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The rule inspects HTTP requests to identify this specific malware signature within the established communication flow.
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Rclone to exfiltrate data to MEGA cloud storage, a technique associated with Akira ransomware campaigns.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
This rule monitors for a variety of indicators associated with malicious activity, including connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific malicious file hashes or filenames, modifications to Windows system policies (specifically Legal Notice configuration), and changes to Active Directory Group Policy Objects using specified GUIDs.
Detects network activity associated with ngrok tunnel domains or suspicious lookalike Microsoft SSO domains (microsoft-sso.com) attempting to perform OIDC discovery, JWKS retrieval, or MFA-related EAM endpoint interactions. This behavior is indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks targeting authentication processes.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with ARToken-style OAuth device code phishing attacks, specifically monitoring for initial backend requests to Cloudflare Workers infrastructure, response payloads containing known phishing template indicators, and subsequent polling activity against device code endpoints that indicate an active phishing session.
Detects various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including known malicious file hashes, suspicious file names commonly associated with staging or initialization in web directories, and network communication to known malicious domains or URLs. It also monitors process execution command lines for references to these IOCs, excluding common browser processes.
Detects various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including known malicious file hashes, suspicious file names commonly associated with staging or initialization in web directories, and network communication to known malicious domains or URLs. It also monitors process execution command lines for references to these IOCs, excluding common browser processes.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal network hosts to a known hardcoded AsyncRAT C2 IP address (158.51.122.136). This indicates a successful infection where a host has established communication with the C2 infrastructure.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
Detects network activity associated with a known malicious campaign using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages as a lure. This includes requests to retrieve tracker scripts from 'fsputnik.com', loading of fake verification pages from 'uasputnik.com', and communication with a known command retrieval endpoint ('admin777111777.php') potentially used for clipboard hijacking.
This rule detects the suspicious copying of a Chromium-based browser 'Web Data' file (which stores sensitive information like saved passwords, credit cards, or address data) to a temporary file, followed by an outbound network connection to a specific exfiltration endpoint pattern within a 30-minute window.
Detects processes establishing persistence via Windows Registry 'Run' keys followed by frequent outbound network connections over non-standard ports. This behavior is consistent with the SystemBC/Coroxy SOCKS5 proxy backdoor often utilized by ransomware actors like Ryuk, Conti, BlackBasta, Play, and Rhysida.
This rule detects a single host performing a high volume of connection attempts to internal IP addresses across standard management and file-sharing ports (SMB 445, RDP 3389, WinRM 5985) within a 5-minute window. Such behavior is characteristic of network scanning or reconnaissance activities performed by adversaries attempting to identify targets for lateral movement.
Detects HTTP and TLS traffic directed toward Vercel subdomains (vercel.app) that are consistent with known patterns for document-lure phishing or gated ZIP file distribution, often used for RMM-phishing campaigns.
Detects HTTP requests and responses involving the download of an executable file named 'ClaudeDesktop.exe' from the 'claude.ai' host, which is indicative of a malicious campaign distributing SectopRAT.
Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects the execution of known tunneling binaries (ngrok, cloudflared) or network connections to tunneling service domains (ngrok.io, ngrok-free.app, trycloudflare.com), which are frequently used to establish unauthorized remote access or bypass perimeter security controls.
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