Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects installation of known malicious npm packages associated with the PhantomSub campaign, which abuse WhatsApp spam channels. It also identifies network connections to known remote C2 channel-list URLs or domains used by these packages to automate channel joining.
Detects DNS queries for the domain 'phf-ubp.com', which is associated with fraudulent HTS infrastructure. This rule monitors network traffic for indicators of communication with known malicious infrastructure.
Detects anomalous outbound HTTP POST requests containing sensitive file extensions or keywords (e.g., .docx, password, credentials) triggered by Python-based clients, followed by a potential exfiltration beacon response containing JSON file path data.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests associated with Cicada3301 ransomware affiliate check-in behavior. The rule monitors for a specific 'X-Session-Id' HTTP header and a corresponding 'affiliate_id' parameter within the request body, which are indicative of malicious C2 communication.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal servers to known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) platforms (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera). This activity is often used by adversaries to establish covert command and control (C2) channels and remote access to internal resources.
Detects anomalous large-scale data transfers to external endpoints that exhibit patterns characteristic of the ShinyHunters group's SaaS bulk export and data exfiltration methods. The rule identifies suspicious HTTP requests to Salesforce API endpoints (e.g., batch jobs, bulk queries) accompanied by unusually large content payloads, followed by subsequent encrypted communication to non-whitelisted external destinations.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
This rule identifies suspicious command and control (C2) activity by monitoring network connections to specific known malicious domains, detection of specific authentication tokens in process command lines, and the use of spoofed User-Agent strings associated with predefined C2 URI paths.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects a suspicious sequence where Microsoft Outlook launches Microsoft Edge to open a URL, and that browser process subsequently makes network connections to infrastructure associated with the ClickFix phishing campaign (e.g., rsvpopenh.one or specific malicious IP).
Detects network connections over port 443 initiated by a process named 'rnpkeys.exe' running from a suspicious staging directory ('\ProgramData\keyroll\'). This behavior is characteristic of side-loaded payloads establishing command-and-control communication for data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency outbound HTTPS POST requests from the 'rnpkeys.exe' process, characteristic of the Sauron Loader exfiltrating screenshot chunks (Message Type 3) to a Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at the '/api/credentials' URI, a pattern associated with AMOS Stealer credential exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple requests occur from a single source within a short timeframe.
This rule detects network activity associated with the Sauron Loader malware. It monitors for TLS connections to known hardcoded C2 domains and identifies HTTP requests following a specific pattern of randomized command and control (C2) paths combined with suspicious User-Agent headers (Windows NT with Edge/Edg).
This rule monitors for network connections and process activities associated with known malicious indicators, including file hashes, C2 IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs. It maps these activities to identify potential command and control communication or other malicious network activity occurring on endpoints.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
Detects outbound network connections from devices to specific suspicious domains identified in the detection logic. This rule monitors for connections to 'ns2.asiainfo.it.com' and 'www.wordcheck.info', which may be indicative of malware communication, command and control, or malicious web activity.
This rule detects outbound HTTP GET requests initiated by a process using a 'WebClient' user-agent to retrieve a file named 'shell.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries downloading second-stage PowerShell payloads to a compromised host.
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