Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,879 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,954
1,378
313
289
239
Contributors
1,807
1,529
1,304
180
173
Categories
20,460
11,847
5,879
5,158
4,866
Platforms
3,747
1,857
1,076
782
160
Products / Services
2,241
1,434
1,273
746
582
MITRE Techniques
2,448
2,151
1,129
937
790
CVEs
19
15
9
7
5
IDS Classtypes
834
334
94
23
20
IDS Protocols
689
276
235
117
23
Detects endpoint network connections to Heroku-hosted domains containing Google Ads tracking parameters (gclid, gad_source, gad_campaignid). This activity is associated with the initial staging phase of 'ShopEase' style malware delivery chains, where users are directed to decoy pages that prepare the environment for subsequent malicious browser-based actions.
Detects endpoint network connections to Heroku-hosted domains containing Google Ads tracking parameters (gclid, gad_source, gad_campaignid). This activity is associated with the initial staging phase of 'ShopEase' style malware delivery chains, where users are directed to decoy pages that prepare the environment for subsequent malicious browser-based actions.
Detects anomalous outbound network connections initiated by security and developer tooling (Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Telnyx). This behavior is consistent with supply-chain attacks, such as those attributed to the UNC6780/TeamPCP threat group, where compromised tooling is leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive cloud credentials or API keys to external, non-vendor infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTPS connections to major generative AI inference endpoints originating from non-browser, non-development tool processes at regular intervals. This activity is indicative of beaconing behavior, where malware (specifically families like LAMEHUG) leverages LLM APIs for dynamic command generation, payload obfuscation, or C2 instruction retrieval, bypassing traditional security controls.
Detects endpoint behavior consistent with AI-assisted exploit development, characterized by the execution of reverse engineering and vulnerability research tools (e.g., IDA Pro, Ghidra, AFL) interleaved with frequent outbound network connections to LLM APIs, followed by the local compilation of a new executable or DLL.
Detects anomalous process activity that reads sensitive developer secrets (such as Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, or Hugging Face API keys) from common configuration or environment files, followed by an outbound network connection to a non-private IP address. This behavior is consistent with credential harvesting and exfiltration tactics used in supply chain attacks to hijack AI services.
This rule identifies potential infections associated with the MacSync malware family by matching process, file, and network indicators (hashes, malicious domains, and specific payload URLs) against endpoint telemetry. It monitors for execution of known malicious binaries, file creation events, and communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access by a single process, followed by local file compression or archiving, and subsequent outbound data transfer to a non-internal IP address. This pattern is characteristic of automated agents (like those used in the GTG-1002/Anthropic AI-orchestrated campaigns) performing rapid data triage and staging for exfiltration.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
This rule monitors for network traffic directed to 'gitnow.dev' using TLS SNI or HTTP headers consistent with WebSocket upgrades. This domain is associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns where attackers instruct users to copy and paste malicious code into a terminal to establish a reverse-tunnel C2 connection.
Detects HTTP traffic originating from curl user agents attempting to communicate with known MacSync Stealer command-and-control URI patterns, specifically targeting GET check-in requests and POST payload exfiltration requests.
Detects a non-browser process initiating network connections to four distinct commercial LLM API providers (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Google Gemini) within a 5-minute interval. This behavior is indicative of a C2 pattern where an adversary uses multiple LLM backends to perform plurality-vote or redundant queries, bypassing typical browser-based AI aggregation services.
Detects a non-browser process initiating network connections to four distinct commercial LLM API providers (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Google Gemini) within a 5-minute interval. This behavior is indicative of a C2 pattern where an adversary uses multiple LLM backends to perform plurality-vote or redundant queries, bypassing typical browser-based AI aggregation services.
Page 67 of 280