Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
This rule monitors for outbound TCP and HTTP traffic to a known malicious infrastructure hosting a fake or compromised 'Corp MDM' (Mobile Device Management) admin panel, which serves as a Command and Control (C2) channel for spyware.
Detects outbound network traffic and HTTP requests originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious infrastructure associated with 'Corp MDM'. The traffic includes C2 communication patterns, specific API URI paths, and potential login interactions on non-standard ports, consistent with phishing, malware delivery, or unauthorized administrative access.
Detects outbound network traffic and HTTP requests originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious infrastructure associated with 'Corp MDM'. The traffic includes C2 communication patterns, specific API URI paths, and potential login interactions on non-standard ports, consistent with phishing, malware delivery, or unauthorized administrative access.
Detects HTTP requests to domains masquerading as Google Play ('playgoogle.') that are attempting to serve Android application packages (.apk). This is a common indicator of malicious sideloading campaigns using typosquatting to deceive users into downloading fake applications.
Detects HTTP requests to domains masquerading as Google Play ('playgoogle.') that are attempting to serve Android application packages (.apk). This is a common indicator of malicious sideloading campaigns using typosquatting to deceive users into downloading fake applications.
Detects HTTP requests to domains masquerading as Google Play ('playgoogle.') that are attempting to serve Android application packages (.apk). This is a common indicator of malicious sideloading campaigns using typosquatting to deceive users into downloading fake applications.
Detects HTTP requests to domains masquerading as Google Play ('playgoogle.') that are attempting to serve Android application packages (.apk). This is a common indicator of malicious sideloading campaigns using typosquatting to deceive users into downloading fake applications.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects network communication associated with the SectopRAT/ArechClient2 remote access trojan, specifically identifying its characteristic length-prefixed, AES-encrypted command-and-control handshake on non-standard ports. The rule matches traffic containing a specific length-prefixed packet structure starting with null bytes, typically seen during C2 check-in.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests resulting in the download of an Android Package (.apk) file where the host is not a known official Google Play or reputable third-party application distribution source. It further validates the detection by inspecting the HTTP response headers for the specific Android application package MIME type and the response body for indicators commonly associated with fake branded application portals.
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
Detects a sequence of Tox P2P protocol packets consisting of a Cookie Request, Cookie Response, and Crypto Handshake within a single network flow. This pattern is indicative of the Tox P2P protocol, which is sometimes abused by malware (e.g., AvisLoader) for command-and-control (C2) communications to evade traditional network inspection.
Detects a sequence of Tox P2P protocol packets consisting of a Cookie Request, Cookie Response, and Crypto Handshake within a single network flow. This pattern is indicative of the Tox P2P protocol, which is sometimes abused by malware (e.g., AvisLoader) for command-and-control (C2) communications to evade traditional network inspection.
Detects HTTP POST requests containing JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods, indicative of malware leveraging blockchain-based infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) resolution.
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