Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the Comet browser process, typically associated with AI-agent operations, accessing sensitive browser profile files (e.g., History, Bookmarks, Login Data, Cookies) followed by outbound network communication within a 15-minute window, excluding known legitimate paths.
Detects the Comet browser process, typically associated with AI-agent operations, accessing sensitive browser profile files (e.g., History, Bookmarks, Login Data, Cookies) followed by outbound network communication within a 15-minute window, excluding known legitimate paths.
This rule monitors network traffic and internal logs for connections to known malicious IP addresses or domain names associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (often impersonating services like HBO Max). The logic explicitly filters out known threat intelligence scanners and security researcher probes. It performs correlation by requiring domain/message matches for generic IP-based alerts to reduce noise, and aggregates events per host over 15-minute windows to produce consolidated alerts.
Detects network communication with domains and IP addresses known to be associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (specifically those masquerading as legitimate HBO Max or macOS related updates). The rule applies a strict correlation between observed malicious IP traffic and specific DNS requests to reduce noise from IP address reuse or threat intelligence feed probes, while also excluding known security-related processes.
Detects outbound network connections from internal devices to public IP addresses over standard MQTT (1883) or MQTT over TLS (8883) ports. MQTT is frequently used for IoT communication but can be abused for command and control (C2) or unauthorized data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
Detects outbound web requests where the referer header indicates the traffic originated from 'accounts.google.com' and the target URI contains 'gusercontent.com', excluding the legitimate 'googleusercontent.com' domain. This behavior is indicative of potential typosquatting or malicious redirection to a lookalike domain, often used in credential theft or phishing campaigns.
This rule monitors for the execution of common penetration testing tools (nuclei, ffuf, sqlmap) and detects network activity towards OpenRouter.ai, a platform that provides access to various Large Language Models (LLMs), often used in automation or script-assisted reconnaissance and exploitation. It also flags instances where container runtimes are used to execute these same tools.
This rule detects network upload operations (HTTP POST or similar requests ending in '/upload') to a specific external IP address (2.26.126.50). It specifically monitors for processes other than common web browsers, and filters for connections where significant data volume (greater than 10KB) is transferred or the data size is unknown.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the cdnsuicaches[.]com domain. The rules identify the initial DNS query, the subsequent TLS SNI connection, and the retrieval of malicious JavaScript containing the 'cookie-captcha-complete' overlay signature. This behavior is indicative of a browser-based social engineering attack.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at a known StealC command-and-control IP address. The rule identifies suspicious beaconing behavior by looking for POST requests that lack a standard User-Agent, do not utilize common HTTP content types, and contain a request body exceeding 16 bytes, suggesting custom binary protocol usage.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at a known StealC command-and-control IP address. The rule identifies suspicious beaconing behavior by looking for POST requests that lack a standard User-Agent, do not utilize common HTTP content types, and contain a request body exceeding 16 bytes, suggesting custom binary protocol usage.
This rule detects instances where a process associated with a known StealC command-and-control (C2) IP address subsequently spawns a hidden cmd.exe instance. It correlates network connections to known malicious infrastructure with the creation of hidden command shells within the same device session, specifically looking for common parent processes like web browsers or system utilities.
This rule detects potential unauthorized use of MeshAgent RMM software by correlating process execution events (mvtcs.exe, MeshAgent) with network traffic to specific IP addresses identified as associated with Settra command-and-control infrastructure. It specifically filters for MeshAgent activity and validates the threat by requiring an established network connection to known malicious endpoints.
This rule detects potential unauthorized use of MeshAgent RMM software by correlating process execution events (mvtcs.exe, MeshAgent) with network traffic to specific IP addresses identified as associated with Settra command-and-control infrastructure. It specifically filters for MeshAgent activity and validates the threat by requiring an established network connection to known malicious endpoints.
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