Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
219 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
109
46
38
12
5
Contributors
46
46
32
31
21
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,872
5,155
4,866
Platforms
158
61
34
25
4
Products / Services
115
75
58
19
18
MITRE Techniques
91
48
34
27
19
CVEs
4
2
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
50
20
16
6
5
IDS Protocols
44
23
21
9
6
Detects high-volume POST requests containing HEIF, HEIC, or AVIF image content types, indicative of automated fuzzing or exploitation attempts against an image-processing endpoint targeting CVE-2026-32882.
This rule monitors and alerts on network traffic (TCP/TLS/HTTP) directed toward a known malicious IP address associated with an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure, categorized under the PREY-0058 designation.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network traffic directed toward specific domains and subdomains identified as associated with the SpiceRAT, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware infrastructure. It correlates data from DNS events and general security/network logs to detect potential command and control (C2) communication patterns, regardless of specific source IP overlap.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of N0va Phishkit verification or session initialization. It looks for specific GET request URI parameters (/api/verification/init?session=, flow=, prompt_profile=) that align with the initial handshake phase of this phishing kit, which is often used for credential and session cookie theft.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of N0va Phishkit verification or session initialization. It looks for specific GET request URI parameters (/api/verification/init?session=, flow=, prompt_profile=) that align with the initial handshake phase of this phishing kit, which is often used for credential and session cookie theft.
Detects outbound RDP-over-TLS traffic directed toward known SilkParasite C2 IP addresses on specific high-numbered ports, or generic RDP-over-TLS patterns on those same non-standard ports, which suggests tunneling or unauthorized remote access.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of N0va Phishkit verification or session initialization. It looks for specific GET request URI parameters (/api/verification/init?session=, flow=, prompt_profile=) that align with the initial handshake phase of this phishing kit, which is often used for credential and session cookie theft.
This rule detects established outbound network connections to 'devtunnels.ms', which is a legitimate service often abused by adversaries to tunnel RDP traffic and bypass network security controls or firewall restrictions. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) from internal hosts to external networks that exhibit patterns consistent with BabylonRAT malware. This rule monitors for a specific threshold of connection attempts over time, which is characteristic of a C2 heartbeat.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Tailscale VPN protocol, specifically identifying potential unauthorized or personal tailnet communication channels. The detection monitors for TLS SNI strings ending in '.ts.net' and WireGuard handshakes on UDP port 41641. These indicators are common to all Tailscale client activity and require environment-specific exclusions of sanctioned Tailscale infrastructure to minimize noise.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Tailscale VPN protocol, specifically identifying potential unauthorized or personal tailnet communication channels. The detection monitors for TLS SNI strings ending in '.ts.net' and WireGuard handshakes on UDP port 41641. These indicators are common to all Tailscale client activity and require environment-specific exclusions of sanctioned Tailscale infrastructure to minimize noise.
Detects periodic outbound network connections from internal hosts to external networks, consistent with command-and-control beaconing behavior often observed in malware like BabylonRAT.
Detects high-frequency, repeated access to a specific fraud-tracking or canary token link by sources utilizing rotating VPNs or proxies over an extended period. This behavior is indicative of automated probing or credential validation attempts associated with the Phantom Deal campaign.
Detects high-frequency, repeated access to a specific fraud-tracking or canary token link by sources utilizing rotating VPNs or proxies over an extended period. This behavior is indicative of automated probing or credential validation attempts associated with the Phantom Deal campaign.
This rule detects TLS handshakes where the Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains an IP address literal instead of a domain name. Legitimate web services and applications typically use FQDNs for TLS SNI to support virtual hosting. Using an IP literal in the SNI field is a technique often used by malware, C2 infrastructure, and malicious scripts to establish encrypted connections while avoiding standard DNS lookups, which may be logged or monitored.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Tailscale VPN protocol, specifically identifying potential unauthorized or personal tailnet communication channels. The detection monitors for TLS SNI strings ending in '.ts.net' and WireGuard handshakes on UDP port 41641. These indicators are common to all Tailscale client activity and require environment-specific exclusions of sanctioned Tailscale infrastructure to minimize noise.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Page 4 of 11