Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects creation of a PHP file under a WordPress wp-content/cache directory attributed either to the mysqld process or to a web-server process (apache2) whose command line contains an INTO OUTFILE-style SQL pattern. In the wp2shell exploit chain, SQL injection reaching author__not_in can be abused to write a webshell via SQL INTO OUTFILE directly into wp-content/cache instead of the plugin-install path, bypassing plugin-directory-focused detections. Requiring database-process or INTO OUTFILE attribution reduces false positives from legitimate caching plugins that generate PHP cache files under this same directory.
Detects PHP files and their containing directories that follow the wp2shell_<hex> naming convention under WordPress wp-content subdirectories (plugins/upgrade/uploads), as dropped by the wp2shell WordPress Core RCE chain (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137). Requires the strict wp-content/<plugins|upgrade|uploads>/...wp2shell_<8-hex> path structure rather than any new plugin directory creation, to avoid flagging legitimate plugin installs. Correlate with process-creation telemetry confirming a web-server process (e.g. apache2) as the creator of the matched path.
Detects creation of PHP web shell files or plugin directories under WordPress wp-content/plugins using the wp2shell_<hex> naming convention, associated with the wp2shell WordPress Core RCE exploitation chain.
Detects creation of PHP web shell files or plugin directories under WordPress wp-content/plugins using the wp2shell_<hex> naming convention, associated with the wp2shell WordPress Core RCE exploitation chain.
Detects creation of PHP web shell files or plugin directories under WordPress wp-content/plugins using the wp2shell_<hex> naming convention, associated with the wp2shell WordPress Core RCE exploitation chain.
Detects XCSSET's settings_app module installing LaunchDaemon-based persistence via a fake Settings.app located outside standard system paths, which also blocks XProtect features.
Detects XCSSET's settings_app module installing LaunchDaemon-based persistence via a fake Settings.app located outside standard system paths, which also blocks XProtect features.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects a WordPress admin plugin ZIP upload to wp-admin/update.php?action=upload-plugin only when correlated with high-risk context: the observed wp2shell_ plugin naming convention, evidence of a just-created/unfamiliar administrator account (wp-admin/user-new.php activity in the same capture), or the upload occurring immediately after REST API batch-route/SQLi anomalies (wp-json/batch/v1, author__not_in) tied to CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137. Routine plugin uploads by established administrators without these correlating indicators are excluded.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects the ZIP archive staged during the wp2shell WordPress RCE chain, identified by the embedded 'wp2shell_<hex>' directory/file naming convention later unpacked under wp-content/upgrade/ and renamed into wp-content/plugins/. Static content matching cannot distinguish a legitimate wp-admin authenticated plugin/theme upload from an attacker-staged payload landing in wp-content/uploads/ -- this rule enforces a fullword, exact 8-hex-character wp2shell_<hex> naming match and MUST be correlated with EDR/process telemetry confirming the ZIP was created by the web-server process (e.g. apache2/php-fpm) outside of an authenticated wp-admin upload session before triggering high-confidence alerting.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects requests to WordPress plugin-install/upload or privileged user REST endpoints occurring shortly after anomalous WordPress REST API batch activity, consistent with post-exploitation follow-through in the wp2shell chain.
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