Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a privilege change within an Atlassian site. Confluence and Jira hold
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
Detects deletion of a role in Centrify for Windows. Removing a role can strip access
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
Detects deletion of a Jira issue security scheme. These schemes restrict who can see
sensitive issues — security findings, HR matters, incident records. Removing one can
expose restricted issues to the whole project at a stroke, and it is a quiet way to
gain access to material that was deliberately walled off.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=jira-project where sourcename='ATLASSIAN'
and action='SECURITY_SCHEME_DELETED'
| groupby user, project, issuesecurityscheme, permissionscheme
sensitive issues — security findings, HR matters, incident records. Removing one can
expose restricted issues to the whole project at a stroke, and it is a quiet way to
gain access to material that was deliberately walled off.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=jira-project where sourcename='ATLASSIAN'
and action='SECURITY_SCHEME_DELETED'
| groupby user, project, issuesecurityscheme, permissionscheme
Detects an endpoint or identity moving from a guest role to a corporate one. Guest
networks are deliberately segregated; a transition to corporate access means either
a legitimate onboarding or an attacker who entered through the least-controlled door
and found a way inward.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
networks are deliberately segregated; a transition to corporate access means either
a legitimate onboarding or an attacker who entered through the least-controlled door
and found a way inward.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
Detects modification of ISE configuration governing who may join the network and
under what conditions. A policy change is the most efficient way to grant durable
unauthorised access: rather than defeating the control repeatedly, the attacker
rewrites it once.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='CISCO-ISE'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, policy
under what conditions. A policy change is the most efficient way to grant durable
unauthorised access: rather than defeating the control repeatedly, the attacker
rewrites it once.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='CISCO-ISE'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, policy
Detects configuration changes to Oracle Audit Vault. The Vault is the integrity
control for database auditing, so altering its configuration can stop collection,
narrow what is recorded, or redirect the audit trail — removing the evidence of
whatever follows.
Treat any change here as affecting the reliability of all database audit data for
the period concerned.
Onboarding: ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 310).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip
control for database auditing, so altering its configuration can stop collection,
narrow what is recorded, or redirect the audit trail — removing the evidence of
whatever follows.
Treat any change here as affecting the reliability of all database audit data for
the period concerned.
Onboarding: ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 310).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip
Detects an endpoint repeatedly failing compliance evaluation. Persistent failure
means either a device nobody is maintaining, or one where a control is being actively
disabled and re-detected — security software stopped, patches removed, agent
tampered with.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 24h
| groupby user, policy, reason
means either a device nobody is maintaining, or one where a control is being actively
disabled and re-detected — security software stopped, patches removed, agent
tampered with.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 24h
| groupby user, policy, reason
Detects an endpoint flipping between compliant and non-compliant repeatedly in a
short period. Stable devices stay in one state. Rapid oscillation suggests something
is being disabled and restored — a security agent stopped and restarted, or posture
data being manipulated to satisfy the check only when it is being observed.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy
| select user, policy, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 6
short period. Stable devices stay in one state. Rapid oscillation suggests something
is being disabled and restored — a security agent stopped and restarted, or posture
data being manipulated to satisfy the check only when it is being observed.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy
| select user, policy, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 6
Detects when an SAP audit message ID appears in security audit logs but is absent from the defined monitoring configuration table, which could indicate attempts to bypass or disable monitoring controls.
A BTP identity provider trust configuration was created, modified, or deleted
A Build Work Zone role was added to or removed from a BTP role collection
A transaction code lock was removed through message ID AUQ
Detects execution of esxcli syslog configuration commands where the command
itself is reconstructed at runtime from hex escape sequences, octal escape sequences, an
awk BEGIN block, or a Python chr()-based decoder before being reset against loghost.
CrowdStrike cataloged this pattern across 21 ESX BusyBox obfuscation techniques used to
hide 'esxcli system syslog config set --reset=loghost' from cleartext shell log review.
Threat actors including SCATTERED SPIDER, BlackBasta, Royal/BlackSuit, and Akira use this
to sever centralized log forwarding from a compromised ESXi host immediately before
encrypting the datastore.
itself is reconstructed at runtime from hex escape sequences, octal escape sequences, an
awk BEGIN block, or a Python chr()-based decoder before being reset against loghost.
CrowdStrike cataloged this pattern across 21 ESX BusyBox obfuscation techniques used to
hide 'esxcli system syslog config set --reset=loghost' from cleartext shell log review.
Threat actors including SCATTERED SPIDER, BlackBasta, Royal/BlackSuit, and Akira use this
to sever centralized log forwarding from a compromised ESXi host immediately before
encrypting the datastore.
Detects Play-style lateral movement via Group Policy: an executable (.exe/.dll) written to a SYSVOL/GPO path by the same non-machine account that modified a GPO in the same 30-minute window. Attackers use this to push ransomware or Cobalt Strike/SystemBC payloads domain-wide.
The following analytic detects the addition of a servicePrincipalName (SPN) containing invisible Unicode characters to an Active Directory computer object via Windows Security Event 5136.
This is the key indicator of the KerberLoss attack (CVE-2026-25177), where an attacker with write access to a machine account's SPN attribute injects a collision SPN that contains a Zero Width or other invisible Unicode character (e.g. U+200C Zero Width Non-Joiner).
LDAP's string preparation rules (RFC 4518) cause these characters to be ignored during uniqueness checking, allowing the write to succeed even when an identical SPN already exists on another machine account.
The Kerberos KDC, however, does not apply the same normalisation — it finds two accounts with matching SPNs and returns KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, causing a Kerberos denial-of-service or forcing clients to fall back to NTLM downgrade.
This is the key indicator of the KerberLoss attack (CVE-2026-25177), where an attacker with write access to a machine account's SPN attribute injects a collision SPN that contains a Zero Width or other invisible Unicode character (e.g. U+200C Zero Width Non-Joiner).
LDAP's string preparation rules (RFC 4518) cause these characters to be ignored during uniqueness checking, allowing the write to succeed even when an identical SPN already exists on another machine account.
The Kerberos KDC, however, does not apply the same normalisation — it finds two accounts with matching SPNs and returns KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, causing a Kerberos denial-of-service or forcing clients to fall back to NTLM downgrade.
Detects high-risk operations performed by the Entra ID/AAD Connect synchronization service account (e.g., Sync_* or ADToAADSyncServiceAccount). This account, which often holds broad directory permissions, is a prime target for attackers to gain persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud directory. The rule monitors for unauthorized sign-ins, sensitive configuration changes (such as modifications to federation trust, authentication policies, or directory synchronization settings), and password resets targeting the sync account itself.
The following analytic detects the execution of "wevtutil.exe" with parameters to disable event logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because disabling event logs is a common tactic used by ransomware to evade detection and hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond effectively to the incident.
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The following analytic detects the use of `get-WebConfigurationProperty` and `Set-ItemProperty` commands in PowerShell to disable HTTP logging on Windows systems. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for script blocks that reference HTTP logging properties and attempt to set them to "false" or "dontLog". Disabling HTTP logging is significant as it can be used by adversaries to cover their tracks and delete logs, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to evade detection and persist in the environment undetected.
The following analytic detects the disabling of audit policies on a domain controller. It leverages EventCode 4719 from Windows Security Event Logs to identify changes where success or failure auditing is removed. This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker may have gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection by tampering with audit policies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe consequences, including data theft, privilege escalation, and full network compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the source and intent of the change.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation in cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP) by identifying the attachment or update of overly permissive policies (e.g., wildcard permissions or administrative roles) followed by rapid execution of high-privilege actions (like creating new users, keys, or profiles) by the same actor within 15 minutes.
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