Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects cross-process injection techniques, such as OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, and memory modifications, specifically targeting 'svchost.exe' instances that do not appear to be hosting critical Windows services. By filtering out known critical services (e.g., RpcSs, DcomLaunch), the rule flags suspicious attempts to inject code into legitimate service host processes to mask malicious activity.
This rule detects in-memory patching of critical Windows security functions, specifically AmsiScanBuffer (used by AMSI) and EtwEventWrite (used by ETW). It monitors for suspicious API calls such as VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory, or NtWriteVirtualMemory targeting these specific DLLs (amsi.dll and ntdll.dll), which is a common technique used by malware and offensive security tools to blind endpoint security and logging mechanisms.
This rule detects in-memory patching of critical Windows security functions, specifically AmsiScanBuffer (used by AMSI) and EtwEventWrite (used by ETW). It monitors for suspicious API calls such as VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory, or NtWriteVirtualMemory targeting these specific DLLs (amsi.dll and ntdll.dll), which is a common technique used by malware and offensive security tools to blind endpoint security and logging mechanisms.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain characteristic of the WordlistLoader/Amatera malware. It identifies the sequential occurrence of module unhooking (via CreateToolhelp32Snapshot), ETW bypass (via AddVectoredExceptionHandler), and remote process injection (via WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, etc.) originating from the same process within a 15-minute window.
Detects instances where a non-SYSTEM process attempts to open a handle to winlogon.exe. Since winlogon.exe typically runs as SYSTEM and manages user sessions, unauthorized access to its process handle is often a precursor to credential dumping or token manipulation attacks aimed at escalating privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects the specific execution gate check utilized by WordlistLoader malware. The rule monitors ProcessApiCall events for OpenEventA or CreateEventA API calls using hardcoded, unique GUIDs known to be associated with this malware, ensuring high fidelity.
Detects the presence of API strings and function names in EDR telemetry associated with the LxBaseRAT keylogging module. The rule monitors for the usage of low-level keyboard hooks (WH_KEYBOARD_LL) and state polling functions (GetAsyncKeyState, GetKeyboardState) commonly used by malicious software to capture user input.
Detects C2Looper injecting shellcode into the legitimate winspool.drv module via a remote thread, excluding legitimate print subsystem processes.
Detects vssvc.exe opening a handle to MsMpEng.exe.
In the RedSun exploit, VSS participates in the cloud-file restore race that directs WD to write through the NTFS junction.
This handle acquisition is observed at the exact moment of exploitation.
vssvc querying MsMpEng is not expected in normal operation.
In the RedSun exploit, VSS participates in the cloud-file restore race that directs WD to write through the NTFS junction.
This handle acquisition is observed at the exact moment of exploitation.
vssvc querying MsMpEng is not expected in normal operation.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior where a process accesses environment variables containing 'TOKIO_WORKER_THREADS' (often associated with Rust applications or specific runtime environments) and simultaneously performs sensitive process operations like 'GetSystemInfo' or 'CreateThread'. This pattern may indicate an attempt by an adversary to perform discovery or process injection within a target application environment.
Detects execution of processes that reference suspicious Windows API functions related to token manipulation or process injection, specifically when initiated by critical system processes like svchost.exe or lsass.exe. This activity often indicates attempts at credential access or privilege escalation.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access or memory dumping attempts against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for events where processes interact with LSASS or execute commands containing 'lsass.exe', 'MiniDump', or 'comsvcs.dll', while excluding known administrative and benign processes like Task Manager, Procdump, and Windows Error Reporting.
Detects credential and token harvesting behaviors associated with the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud 2.0 npm worm, specifically targeting CI/CD environments. The rule monitors for unauthorized access to /proc/[pid]/mem to scrape memory for workflow secrets, extraction of OIDC environment variables, and suspicious invocation of the GitHub CLI (gh) to steal authentication tokens.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access or memory dumping attempts against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for events where processes interact with LSASS or execute commands containing 'lsass.exe', 'MiniDump', or 'comsvcs.dll', while excluding known administrative and benign processes like Task Manager, Procdump, and Windows Error Reporting.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access or memory-dump activity targeting chrome.exe, consistent with extraction of the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key or wrapped identity/UV private keys used to decrypt synced passkey credentials (Golden Pass-ta-key attack). Excludes known legitimate crash-dump and diagnostic tooling (WerFault, crashpad_handler, procdump, Chrome itself).
Detects non-browser, non-password-manager processes accessing browser process memory (potential in-memory cookie theft), copying browser credential/cookie database files (Login Data, Cookies, Local State, key4.db, logins.json), or enumerating stored Wi-Fi profile keys via netsh wlan show profile key=clear - behaviors associated with CornFlake RAT credential theft and Wi-Fi credential harvesting used in the CaptiveCrunch campaign.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access or memory-dump activity targeting chrome.exe, consistent with extraction of the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key or wrapped identity/UV private keys used to decrypt synced passkey credentials (Golden Pass-ta-key attack). Excludes known legitimate crash-dump and diagnostic tooling (WerFault, crashpad_handler, procdump, Chrome itself).
Detects autoit3.exe invoking process injection Windows APIs (OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, CloseHandle) from kernel32.dll targeting the legitimate charmap.exe process, consistent with the AutoIT payload injector chain delivering VIPKeylogger/MedusaHVNC.
Detects unauthorized process injection attempts—such as remote thread creation, memory writes, or OpenProcess calls—targeting browser processes (chrome.exe, firefox.exe). The rule filters out known-legitimate security tools and browser helper processes by leveraging process names, company metadata, and valid digital signatures. This activity is indicative of credential or crypto wallet theft, as seen in stealers like Dolphin X.
Detects an untrusted process accessing sensitive browser credential and cookie files across multiple browser families and profiles in a short period, followed immediately by the creation of a ZIP archive. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of credential-stealing malware like Dolphin X, which aggregates stolen browser data into an archive for exfiltration.
Detects cross-process memory operations and CreateRemoteThread calls targeting explorer.exe or svchost.exe from non-standard (untrusted) process paths. This activity is consistent with StealC infostealer unpacking and injection behavior, typically following initial execution by SmartLoader as seen in recent FakeGit/AgentBaiting campaigns.
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