Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects creation of a hardcoded mutex object used by the WLDR C2 implant to enforce single-instance execution and prevent duplicate agent processes.
Detects instances where a process attempts to change memory permissions (using VirtualProtect) on sensitive security-related modules 'amsi.dll' or 'ntdll.dll'. This is a common technique used by shellcode loaders and malware to disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) by patching their respective scan functions in memory.
This rule detects potentially malicious process injection activities where an unsigned or improperly signed process attempts to perform actions like creating a remote thread or opening a process against critical system processes (explorer.exe, svchost.exe), followed closely by the loading of an unsigned module by those same system processes.
Detects creation of the NVIDIA-themed single-instance mutex 'Local\NVIDIAContainerMonitor_SingleInstance' used by LabubaRAT to prevent multiple concurrent implant executions.
Detects processes attempting to enumerate or interact with virtualization-related software such as VirtualBox, VMware, XenServer, or QEMU. This behavior is a common anti-analysis technique used by malware to detect if it is executing within a virtualized sandbox or hypervisor environment.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the ServiceModelReg.exe process, a known vector for ResiLoader process hollowing. It monitors for cross-process injection (e.g., process hollowing) and process creation events where ServiceModelReg.exe is spawned by suspicious parent processes (such as scripting engines) or originates from an unexpected location.
Detects processes attempting to interact with the macOS NSPasteboard (clipboard) that are not typically associated with standard clipboard utility operations like Maccy, pbcopy, or pbpaste. This may indicate unauthorized data collection or exfiltration of sensitive information copied to the system clipboard.
Detects the Snowlight dropper (wusvc.exe) attempting to open handles to known security analysis, debugging, and monitoring tools. This activity is a form of analyst environment detection used by the malware to identify if it is being executed within a research or sandbox environment before proceeding with further malicious actions.
This rule detects potential process injection activities associated with the HijackLoader (IDAT Loader) malware family. It monitors Sysmon event logs for sequences involving process creation, image loading, and inter-process manipulation, specifically flagging the use of CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, and process access patterns (such as writing thread rights) indicative of reflective DLL injection used to deliver payloads like Vidar.
This rule detects potentially malicious access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process (lsass.exe). It correlates events where a process requests sensitive access rights (0x1010 or PROCESS_VM_READ) to LSASS with other activities indicating the presence of Mimikatz or related credential dumping tools (e.g., presence of 'mimikatz' or 'sekurlsa' in process names or command lines).
Detects various indicators of credential dumping associated with Mimikatz and manual extraction of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). This includes execution of Mimikatz, use of specific modules like lsadump::dcsync and sekurlsa::logonpasswords, direct access to the LSASS process, and usage of ntdsutil or vssadmin to create shadow copies for NTDS.dit file access.
This rule detects unauthorized processes attempting to open a handle to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) with PROCESS_VM_READ access rights. Such access is often associated with credential dumping techniques, particularly those utilizing direct syscalls to evade EDR and kernel-level monitoring by bypassing standard Windows API-based detection mechanisms.
Detects signs of process hollowing targeting ServiceModelReg.exe, a technique used by ResiLoader to execute the StealC information stealer. The rule monitors for suspicious cross-process access (high-privilege handles), remote thread creation, and anomalous module loading patterns within the target process.
Detects a process attempting to read its own Process Environment Block (PEB) using NtQueryInformationProcess in combination with ReadProcessMemory, a technique commonly used by malware to detect the presence of a debugger by inspecting the NtGlobalFlag field.
Detects the privilege escalation sequence used by VILE ransomware, which involves manipulating process tokens via a combination of OpenProcessToken, LookupPrivilegeValueW, AdjustTokenPrivileges, GetTokenInformation, SetTokenInformation, and DuplicateTokenEx. This is followed by the termination of processes using TerminateProcess, typically performed to release locked files before encryption.
Detects potential privilege escalation attempts targeting AnyDesk runtime via named pipe exploitation. The rule monitors for unauthorized cross-process access to AnyDesk processes, AnyDesk spawning suspicious child processes indicative of post-exploitation activity, and the execution of a known vulnerable AnyDesk binary version.
This rule monitors for indicators of process hollowing or memory injection targeting ServiceModelReg.exe. It correlates suspicious events including the creation of suspended processes, memory writes, remote thread creation, specific debug strings (e.g., RUNPE, PEB patched), and outbound network connections. This approach aims to reduce noise from legitimate use of ServiceModelReg.exe by requiring multiple indicators of malicious behavior.
Detects activity associated with the 'MiniBrowse.exe' process, which exhibits behaviors characteristic of unauthorized browser credential and cookie harvesting. This includes targeting browser 'Login Data' files, accessing cookies, attempting to interact with legitimate browser processes (chrome.exe, msedge.exe) via cross-process operations, and writing logs to 'edgeLog.txt'.
Advanced hunt for injected payloads modifying the memory space of ntdll.dll to patch EtwEventWrite or NtManageHotPatch, blinding EDR telemetry. This rule specifically looks for WriteProcessMemory API calls targeting ntdll.dll from processes like InstallUtil.exe, MSBuild.exe, and powershell.exe, which are commonly abused for code execution and evasion.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that utilize the Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods namespace to resolve native NT API functions (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, etc.) and perform reflective code loading of a headerless PE payload from a staging directory (C:\ProgramData\wt1). This activity is associated with UAC-0226/GIFTEDCROOK threat campaigns.
Detects instances where the Windows Error Reporter (wermgr.exe) process attempts to open a handle to a Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) device. This behavior is anomalous as legitimate VSS operations are typically performed by dedicated system processes (e.g., vssvc.exe, diskshadow.exe), and such access by wermgr.exe may indicate an attempt to bypass file locks for credential dumping or sensitive data exfiltration.
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