Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
665 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
257
174
86
76
36
Contributors
214
130
63
53
33
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
665
Platforms
641
26
7
3
2
Products / Services
317
186
85
32
25
MITRE Techniques
365
233
219
210
197
CVEs
2
2
2
2
1
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
This rule correlates three suspicious behaviors occurring within 10 minutes: a non-root process identified as 'bumsrakete' executes, this process accesses the sensitive kernel memory file '/dev/mem', and subsequently, a root process is spawned that is not a standard privilege escalation utility (such as sudo, su, etc.). This sequence of events is highly indicative of potential malicious activity, such as kernel-level exploitation or unauthorized privilege escalation.
Detects cross-process memory write activity characteristic of the SPECTRALVIPER reflective injection technique. The rule identifies specific carrier processes (such as IntelAudioService.exe or OneDrive.Sync.Services.exe) that are either unsigned or spawned by a suspicious parent process, performing memory operations on other processes.
Detects the SimpleHelp process (identified by JWrapper) attempting to open the LSASS process, which is a common technique for credential dumping. This rule specifically looks for process access events where the target is 'lsass.exe' and the initiating process is associated with SimpleHelp.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious processes accessing sensitive files within the Linux /proc filesystem or application-specific directories (such as graph_api.py, main.py, or requirements.txt). By excluding standard administrative tools like systemd, rpm, dpkg, and apt, this rule highlights processes that may be performing reconnaissance, credential harvesting, or attempting to read source code in an abnormal manner.
This rule detects suspicious remote thread creation events (Sysmon Event ID 8) where a process initiates a thread in high-value system processes like lsass.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or winlogon.exe. It specifically filters out activity originating from common Windows system directories, highlighting potential process injection attempts by unauthorized binaries.
Detects AstarionRAT installing a global keyboard hook (SetWindowsHookEx) to capture user keystrokes. This rule relies on advanced API tracking telemetry to identify the SetWindowsHookExApiCall action type and then joins with process events to filter for executables running from the AppData folder.
Detects network connection attempts or successes from critical Windows processes (System, svchost.exe, lsass.exe) targeting the localhost interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on non-standard ports (above 1024, excluding SMB ports 445/139). This behavior is often indicative of local process injection, credential dumping activity, or unauthorized inter-process communication used by malware to bypass network security controls.
Detects the presence of Remcos RAT by correlating a specific mutex (Remcos_Mutex_Inj) indicative of active malicious processes with an outbound network connection to a known command-and-control (C2) IP address (62.102.148.212) on port 37393. This combination is characteristic of Remcos RAT operations used for unauthorized audio and webcam surveillance.
Detects suspicious handle requests (Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread, Event ID 10: ProcessAccess) targeting critical Windows processes lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe from unauthorized source processes. The rule specifically looks for suspicious access rights and filters out known legitimate system processes.
Detects cross-process memory injection patterns by correlating Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logs for VirtualAllocEx (with executable protection) and WriteProcessMemory, combined with Sysmon image load events to verify the target process has loaded user32.dll, a common indicator for GUI-related processes often targeted for injection.
Detects instances where the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) initiates a network connection to the loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1), excluding standard SMB traffic (Port 445). Such behavior by LSASS is highly anomalous and may indicate exploitation attempts, such as memory dumping or credential harvesting techniques involving inter-process communication.
Detects suspicious handle requests (Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread, Event ID 10: ProcessAccess) targeting critical Windows processes lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe from unauthorized source processes. The rule specifically looks for suspicious access rights and filters out known legitimate system processes.
Detects cross-process memory injection patterns by correlating Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logs for VirtualAllocEx (with executable protection) and WriteProcessMemory, combined with Sysmon image load events to verify the target process has loaded user32.dll, a common indicator for GUI-related processes often targeted for injection.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity characterized by a sequence of API calls (VirtualAlloc, CreateRemoteThread, WriteProcessMemory) in conjunction with the loading of 'mpr.dll'. This combination of events can indicate an attempt to inject malicious code into a process, potentially for evasion or privilege escalation. The rule filters out common legitimate processes to reduce false positives.
This rule detects suspicious attempts by non-browser processes to access Google Chrome's process memory or create threads within it. This behavior is often indicative of process injection techniques used by malware to hook into or extract data from the browser, potentially for credential theft or session hijacking. The rule specifically looks for API calls like OpenProcess, NtCreateProcessEx, CreateRemoteThread, NtReadVirtualMemory, and ReadProcessMemory targeting 'chrome.exe' by processes other than Chrome itself or its legitimate update/driver executables.
Detects Vidar Stealer attempting to access virtual memory of Chrome, Edge, or Brave processes to locate the v20_master_key, which is used to bypass Application-Bound Encryption. This rule also identifies suspicious browser process creations with specific command-line arguments that might indicate stealer activity.
This rule detects attempts by processes located outside of standard system directories (C:\Windows, C:\Program Files) but within user or program data directories (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData, C:\AppData) to access clipboard data. This could indicate malicious activity where an unauthorized application is trying to exfiltrate sensitive information from the clipboard.
Detects instances where 'node' or 'bun' runtime processes access multiple sensitive developer configuration or credential files (e.g., .ssh, .aws/credentials, .npmrc, .kube/config). This behavior is indicative of potential credential theft or reconnaissance activities by an adversary attempting to leverage developer environments.
Detects the spawning of svchost.exe processes from parent processes associated with Windows Mixed Reality or NvdaHelperRemote, which may indicate malicious process injection or suspicious use of GDI screen capture APIs within a masqueraded service context.
Detects potential process injection attempts targeting svchost.exe by monitoring for specific memory manipulation and object handling APIs (ZwWriteVirtualMemory, NtDuplicateObject, ZwQueryAttributesFile). Also monitors for a synthetic process event containing a specific hardcoded command line string associated with potential malicious setup activity.
Detects unauthorized modification of the amsi.dll memory space using process access operations such as VirtualProtect. This behavior is a common technique used by malware and scripts to disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in-memory, allowing for the execution of malicious payloads without triggering security product alerts. The rule specifically monitors for sensitive process access granted to amsi.dll originating from high-risk parent processes such as PowerShell, script interpreters, and Microsoft Office applications.
Page 20 of 32