Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects common LSASS memory dumping techniques, including suspicious process access rights (EventID 10) and the execution of tools or techniques (EventID 1) such as comsvcs.dll, procdump, taskmgr, or werfault, which are often used to harvest credentials.
Detects instances where PowerShell initiates process injection behaviors, specifically targeting common user-facing applications such as browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe), build tools (csc.exe), or indexing services (SearchIndexer.exe). The rule identifies memory allocation and thread manipulation activities often associated with reflective code injection or memory-based payloads.
This rule detects attempts by a process (specifically targeting PowerShell or .NET loaders) to tamper with Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) components in memory. It correlates EDR or Sysmon events (process access, module loads) targeting 'amsi.dll' or involving specific AMSI API strings like 'AmsiScanBuffer' or 'AmsiInitFailed' with potential malicious loader activity.
This rule detects unauthorized memory modification of ntdll.dll, specifically targeting the EtwEventWrite function, by identifying processes writing to memory regions with execution-permission flags (e.g., PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to blind Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) telemetry, often following suspicious .NET assembly loading (such as Assembly.Load) typical of malware loaders like LausivLoader.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
Detects sensitive access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, commonly associated with credential dumping attempts. This rule monitors Windows Security Event 4663, specifically flagging processes attempting to gain specific access levels (e.g., Read, Query, or Full Control) to the lsass.exe process.
The following analytic detects a process requesting duplicate-handle and query-limited-information access to winlogon.exe.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40) and PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000).
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40) and PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000).
The following analytic detects duplicate-handle access to known UAC-bypass binaries from a non-standard source path.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
The following analytic detects potential process injection attempts into executables that are commonly abused leveraging Sysmon EventCode 10.
It identifies Access Mask requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe and calc.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files.
This activity was associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox.
Monitoring this activity may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code.
It identifies Access Mask requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe and calc.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files.
This activity was associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox.
Monitoring this activity may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code.
This rule detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll.dll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread'. This API call can be abused by adversaries as an alternative to standard thread creation APIs (like CreateThread) to execute shellcode or malicious code in a suspicious process context, often as part of process injection techniques.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
Detects suspicious process injection, module loads, or thread creation events where a web browser process (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) is the target, excluding known legitimate browser-related processes or sub-components like the elevation service.
This rule detects processes accessing or modifying Microsoft Outlook data files (.pst or .ost), which may indicate an attempt to collect, stage, or export sensitive email data from a local system.
Detects instances of thread execution where the start module is identified as a critical system component (ntdll.dll or kernel32.dll) but the associated call trace contains 'UNKNOWN' entries. This behavior is indicative of call stack spoofing, a technique used by malicious software to hide the true origin of code execution and evade endpoint security analysis by mimicking legitimate thread start addresses.
Detects attempts to patch ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) functions such as EtwEventWrite within the memory space of PowerShell or PWSH processes. This is a common technique used by attackers to suppress telemetry and evade security monitoring tools, often associated with bypassing AMSI/ETW logging mechanisms.
Detects attempts to patch ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) functions such as EtwEventWrite within the memory space of PowerShell or PWSH processes. This is a common technique used by attackers to suppress telemetry and evade security monitoring tools, often associated with bypassing AMSI/ETW logging mechanisms.
Detects a classic process injection technique where an external process attempts to gain high-level access (OpenProcess with 0x1F0FFF) to charmap.exe. This activity is often a precursor to further injection steps such as VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread, a behavior consistent with malicious payloads like AsyncRAT executed via an abused AutoIT interpreter.
This rule detects potential credential dumping activities by monitoring for the execution of Mimikatz or command-line arguments associated with credential extraction (e.g., 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords'). Additionally, it monitors for suspicious process access attempts to 'lsass.exe' with specific high-privileged access masks often used by credential dumping tools to read process memory.
Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
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