Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
665 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
257
174
86
76
36
Contributors
214
130
63
53
33
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
665
Platforms
641
26
7
3
2
Products / Services
317
186
85
32
25
MITRE Techniques
365
233
219
210
197
CVEs
2
2
2
2
1
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
This rule detects potential credential theft activity by monitoring for unauthorized access to sensitive browser-related credential files (e.g., Login Data, cookies.sqlite) or direct access to the LSASS process memory by non-standard browser processes. It further correlates these events with user sign-ins on previously unknown or unassociated devices within a short timeframe to identify potential account compromise.
Detects potential credential harvesting or process memory manipulation against browser processes (Chrome or Edge). The rule monitors for unauthorized debugging activity initiated against browser processes (e.g., using flags like DEBUG_PROCESS or specific API calls) and the access of the App-Bound encryption provider symbol, which is often a target for attackers seeking to decrypt browser-stored secrets.
Detects HVNC backdoor payload containing hardcoded AV/EDR process names combined with process enumeration APIs and a hex-suffixed mutex naming pattern, reducing false positives from generic AV name or API string matches alone
Detects HVNC backdoor payload containing hardcoded AV/EDR process names combined with process enumeration APIs and a hex-suffixed mutex naming pattern, reducing false positives from generic AV name or API string matches alone
Detects potential credential harvesting or process memory manipulation against browser processes (Chrome or Edge). The rule monitors for unauthorized debugging activity initiated against browser processes (e.g., using flags like DEBUG_PROCESS or specific API calls) and the access of the App-Bound encryption provider symbol, which is often a target for attackers seeking to decrypt browser-stored secrets.
Detects potential credential harvesting or process memory manipulation against browser processes (Chrome or Edge). The rule monitors for unauthorized debugging activity initiated against browser processes (e.g., using flags like DEBUG_PROCESS or specific API calls) and the access of the App-Bound encryption provider symbol, which is often a target for attackers seeking to decrypt browser-stored secrets.
This rule detects potential credential and keystroke theft by identifying the installation of a Windows hook (SetWindowsHookEx) followed within 30 minutes by file access to sensitive browser credential stores (Login Data, key4.db, etc.) by the same process on a single device.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects potential credential harvesting or process memory manipulation against browser processes (Chrome or Edge). The rule monitors for unauthorized debugging activity initiated against browser processes (e.g., using flags like DEBUG_PROCESS or specific API calls) and the access of the App-Bound encryption provider symbol, which is often a target for attackers seeking to decrypt browser-stored secrets.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
Detects anomalous access to specific memory sections associated with Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe) followed by a crash of the same process within a 30-minute window. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of exploitation attempts targeting DWM memory management to achieve code execution or privilege escalation.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects instances where a non-SYSTEM process attempts to open a handle to winlogon.exe. Since winlogon.exe typically runs as SYSTEM and manages user sessions, unauthorized access to its process handle is often a precursor to credential dumping or token manipulation attacks aimed at escalating privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
Detects token duplication/impersonation targeting winlogon.exe to obtain SYSTEM privileges (SeDebugPrivilege abuse, DuplicateToken, SetTokenInformation to Untrusted integrity)
This rule detects cross-process injection techniques, such as OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, and memory modifications, specifically targeting 'svchost.exe' instances that do not appear to be hosting critical Windows services. By filtering out known critical services (e.g., RpcSs, DcomLaunch), the rule flags suspicious attempts to inject code into legitimate service host processes to mask malicious activity.
Detects anomalous network connections to the local Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) debugging interface (127.0.0.1) associated with suspicious commands or function calls. This pattern is indicative of msaRAT malware attempting to perform process injection, bypass Content Security Policy (CSP), or execute code within a target browser process.
Detects processes attempting to open a handle to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process with read-capable access rights (0x1010 or 0x1410). These access rights are commonly associated with credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, which read LSASS process memory to extract credentials. Legitimate system processes such as wininit.exe and services.exe are excluded to reduce noise.
Page 9 of 32