Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,480 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects execution of GoldenDMSA hacktool used for Directory Service Account manipulation.
Detects anomalous activities associated with potential PHP2Shell exploitation or webshell deployment where a web server worker (such as Apache, HTTPD, or PHP) spawns a Unix shell containing suspicious utility tokens, drops a PHP file outside excluded directories, or creates a PHP session-derived file.
Detects potential bootkit activity or unauthorized modifications to the EFI system partition by correlating non-standard .efi file writes with subsequent execution of boot configuration utilities like bcdedit or mountvol within a 30-minute window.
Detects instances where inst.exe running from C:\ProgramData\Intel with specific command-line arguments (extensionless and key-like) subsequently writes files to the EFI system partition or boot paths on the same device.
Correlates an inbound connection to a Python/Xoscar/Xinference pool process with an outbound connection from a shell spawned by that same pool process shortly afterward, potentially indicating exploitation and reverse shell activity.
Detects command output staged in a temporary file (/tmp/nx_cmd.txt) by a Unix shell spawned from ExifTool or Perl, typically resulting from Gotenberg CVE-2026-42589 exploitation, or detects the specific staging filename behavior independently.
Detects behavioral indicators of an SSH or autossh reverse tunnel (-R) executed with no remote command (-N) and host-key checking disabled, combined with network connections to a known command and control IP address.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects a sequence where a SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) related to SharePoint, followed shortly (within 1 hour) by high-fidelity lateral movement tooling or remote execution techniques (such as PsExec, WMI, PowerShell remoting, or scheduled tasks) on the same host.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell or PWSH executes a web download referencing an .mp4 file using download cmdlets, followed within 1 hour by the execution of NetSupport Manager components (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from a user-writable path.
Detects newly seen devices (no Tailscale process activity in the prior 30 days) executing Tailscale enrollment or login commands followed by outbound network connections to Tailscale control infrastructure within 10 minutes, potentially indicating unauthorized VPN tunneling.
Detects Tailscale serve commands setting up a TCP forward to a Unix socket (such as tailscaled.sock), correlated with recent file creation, modification, or renaming events involving the socket file by a non-standard process within a 1-hour window.
Detects a web server process (apache2, httpd, php-fpm) spawning a Unix shell (dash/sh) that executes discovery commands such as id, whoami, hostname, or find. This is the durable post-exploitation signature of the wp2shell WordPress pre-auth RCE chain (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137), where a malicious plugin or webshell executes commands through the web stack.
Detects a web browser spawning a script interpreter or dual-use
LOLBin, the execution hand-off typical of an AI-drafted phishing lure where the
victim clicks a link/attachment and content is immediately executed by
PowerShell, cmd, mshta, wscript or cscript. Legitimate browsers almost never
spawn these interpreters as direct children, making this a high-fidelity signal
of a browser-to-interpreter phishing chain as described for AI-assisted
cybercrime activity.
LOLBin, the execution hand-off typical of an AI-drafted phishing lure where the
victim clicks a link/attachment and content is immediately executed by
PowerShell, cmd, mshta, wscript or cscript. Legitimate browsers almost never
spawn these interpreters as direct children, making this a high-fidelity signal
of a browser-to-interpreter phishing chain as described for AI-assisted
cybercrime activity.
Detects a sequence where a FortiSIEM-related process writes or modifies a shell script in a cron or phoenix directory, followed closely within 2 minutes by a child process spawned by cron executing that same written script file.
Detects web servers (httpd, apache2, nginx, php-fpm) or Request Tracker (RT) Perl worker processes spawning suspicious child processes such as shells, downloaders, netcat, or Python interpreters, indicative of post-exploitation or web application compromise.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that execute SysMon.py from the non-standard C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\ directory, or the corresponding scheduled task creation events.
Detects Python interpreter activity accessing multiple credential store categories (such as password managers, Discord, SSH keys, or Steam) in a short window on a single device, or specific stealer scripts associated with known file paths.
Detects shadow copy destruction and recovery feature tampering used
by Akira and other ransomware families to prevent victims from restoring data.
Covers vssadmin / wmic shadowcopy deletion, wbadmin catalog deletion and
bcdedit recovery-disabling commands executed from the command line.
by Akira and other ransomware families to prevent victims from restoring data.
Covers vssadmin / wmic shadowcopy deletion, wbadmin catalog deletion and
bcdedit recovery-disabling commands executed from the command line.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects the execution of NetSupport Manager client binaries (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from user-writable directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public folders, optionally spawned by script loaders or command interpreters.
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