Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious file execution by monitoring for the usage of .pif files, often disguised as image files or documents, which subsequently launch suspicious child processes such as msiexec, wscript, cscript, or rundll32. The detection logic matches on specific parent processes (e.g., browsers, email clients, file explorers) triggering the file, followed by suspicious command line arguments within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of WSF scripts from the AppData directory, followed by registry modifications using reg.exe or rundll32.exe. Additionally, it monitors for the creation or presence of specific suspicious files (clspack.exe, filetext.txt, prnfig.wsf) in user profile directories, often indicative of staging or persistence.
Detects instances where a Terraform process or its associated provider plugins spawn a Go toolchain process (go.exe) to execute a local package. This pattern is associated with malicious Terraform providers that use this technique to bootstrap second-stage payloads such as the Graphalgo RAT.
Detects a suspected malicious activity pattern known as the Veltrix Capital fake job-lure. The rule monitors for a sequence where a user clones a job-task repository (containing 'veltrix-capital' in the command) followed by the installation of a suspicious dependency (using names like 'graph*' or 'big*' with npm or pip) within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a Go toolchain is used to fetch dependencies, followed by a 'go run' execution that spawns a child process which initiates an outbound network connection shortly thereafter. This behavior is indicative of a 'hidden entry point' pattern where legitimate development tools are abused to download, compile, and execute a second-stage remote access trojan (RAT) or malicious payload.
Detects anomalous command execution patterns indicative of DarkMe/Graphalgo-style RATs. The detection triggers when a single parent process initiates multiple suspicious C2-driven actions within a 24-hour window. These actions include executing Go language commands, Node.js script execution, or delayed self-deletion sequences.
Detects instances where a Terraform provider process spawns a child process (go.exe or cmd.exe) to execute 'go run .'. This behavior is atypical for standard Terraform provider execution and may indicate the use of malicious providers that compile and execute code on-the-fly, a technique used to evade signature-based detection.
Detects instances where a Terraform provider process initiates a child process that is either the Go runtime (executing 'go run') or a Windows command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This behavior is often indicative of malicious code execution during the provider's execution lifecycle, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities in the Terraform provider ecosystem.
Detects network connections to the Slack API (api.slack.com) initiated by processes executing from temporary directories commonly used by the Go build system ('go-build'). This pattern is indicative of a second-stage RAT or malicious payload compiled on-the-fly using 'go run' or similar mechanisms, utilizing Slack's infrastructure for C2 communication.
Detects instances where Node.js, Python, or Go processes spawn command shell interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.). This behavior is often indicative of C2 command execution by malware, such as the Graphalgo RAT, which may use these languages to execute shell-level commands after initial infection or payload execution.
Detects instances where WScript or CScript (Windows Script Host) spawns PowerShell with common obfuscation and persistence flags, specifically executing in a hidden, non-interactive, headless, and encoded command mode. This pattern is commonly used by malicious scripts (e.g., VBScript or JScript) to execute secondary payloads while minimizing visual indicators on the host.
Detects the execution of a file named 'setup.exe' from suspicious user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData) when the command line arguments contain keywords associated with archive utilities like 7-Zip or Foobar2000. This pattern is indicative of a 'nested installer' technique where legitimate software utilities are leveraged to extract or execute malicious payloads.
This rule detects the execution of processes associated with known malicious SHA256 file hashes linked to OpenSUpdater. It monitors DeviceProcessEvents from the past 30 days to identify instances where these specific file hashes are executed on endpoints.
This rule detects the execution of a file named 'setup.exe' that is spawned by common interpreters (explorer.exe, msiexec.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) where the command line arguments reference archiving or compression utilities like 'foobar2000', '7z', or '7zip'. This is a common pattern for self-extracting (SFX) installers or malicious droppers attempting to execute payload components.
This rule detects executable files (ending in .exe) executing from a specific subdirectory within the user's AppData path (\AppData\Microsoft\Update\). This path is often used by adversaries to masquerade malicious activity or persistence mechanisms as legitimate update processes. The rule excludes common system service accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) to reduce noise, focusing on processes initiated by user-level accounts.
This rule detects the loading of a suspicious DLL file named 'active_desktop_render_x64.dll' or the initiation of activity by a process named 'PDF_C2089_20260911100446.exe', which may indicate the execution of malicious code or potential process injection activity.
This rule monitors DeviceProcessEvents for the execution of known malicious binaries associated with the SilverFox malware. It specifically looks for occurrences of three distinct SHA256 file hashes within the last 30 days.
Detects instances where the Adobe ColdFusion service (jrun.exe or java.exe) spawns common command-line shells, administrative tools, or utility processes. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of ColdFusion vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2023-26360 or CVE-2023-29298, where an adversary gains initial access and executes commands on the underlying system.
Detects credential dumping attempts against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The rule identifies processes attempting to access LSASS memory using specific access masks often associated with credential extraction, or the presence of the Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords' command in the process command line.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'CreateObjectTask' via schtasks or PowerShell, which is associated with spawning 'dllhost.exe' as a child process under high-privileged parent processes (svchost, taskeng, or schtasks). This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or privilege escalation techniques leveraging system tasks.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to add an exclusion path within the AppData directory. This behavior is often associated with malware or threat actors attempting to whitelist malicious payloads to evade security scanning.
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