Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,114
7,174
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,499
11,881
5,887
5,179
4,868
Platforms
18,094
3,056
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,726
4,303
3,716
1,175
958
MITRE Techniques
9,492
7,575
3,460
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the execution of the 'sckit' Go implant, a malicious binary associated with trojanized '@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin' or 'MemoryOS' packages. The rule identifies instances where this binary is spawned as a child process of a language runtime (Node.js or Python) when the execution originates from specific directory paths associated with these packages, or when the parent process command line indicates these packages are being initialized.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects instances where Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) spawns cmd.exe or wscript.exe to execute batch files (.bat) or scripts with specific filenames. This behavior is often associated with malicious user activity, such as executing payloads disguised as innocuous files triggered via shell interactions.
This rule detects LSASS credential dumping attempts by correlating the execution of a dump command (via process command line) with the subsequent creation of a temporary file in the Windows Temp directory. The rule is specifically designed to bypass evasion techniques that introduce randomized delays between the LSASS process access and the file write operation by utilizing a 30-minute join window.
Detects the execution of pypykatz or Python scripts invoking pypykatz commands to perform credential dumping, specifically targeting LSASS memory or minidump files.
Detects command-line activity indicative of attempts to dump LSASS memory after performing in-memory unhooking or bypassing of security monitoring DLLs (ntdll.dll, amsi.dll, win32kbase.sys). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to harvest credentials while evading EDR/AV visibility.
Detects a process initiating a memory dump of lsass.exe (using --dump arguments) followed within 15 minutes by the creation of a hexadecimal-named .tmp file in the Windows\Temp directory. This behavioral pattern is characteristic of credential dumping using reflected cloning or similar techniques, followed by the staging of obfuscated or encrypted minidump data for exfiltration.
This rule detects LSASS credential dumping attempts by correlating the execution of a dump command (via process command line) with the subsequent creation of a temporary file in the Windows Temp directory. The rule is specifically designed to bypass evasion techniques that introduce randomized delays between the LSASS process access and the file write operation by utilizing a 30-minute join window.
This rule detects potential post-exploitation activity following a SharePoint XamlServices.Parse() deserialization attack. It monitors the w3wp.exe (IIS worker process) for the loading of suspicious .NET deserialization-related assemblies (e.g., System.Xaml.dll) followed by the execution of a shell process (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) within a short window, which is indicative of fileless web shell activity.
Detects suspicious activities associated with ysoserial.net gadget chain exploitation targeting SharePoint's w3wp.exe process. The rule correlates the loading of specific .NET assemblies (PresentationFramework, System.Xaml, System.Data.Services) with the subsequent execution of command shells (cmd, powershell) or the presence of common ysoserial.net-related strings (ActivitySurrogateSelector, LosFormatter) within command lines originating from the w3wp.exe process, indicating a potential web shell.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects the use of csc.exe (C# compiler) launched from PowerShell with hidden or bypass flags, as well as the subsequent execution of cvtres.exe. This activity is commonly associated with fileless malware techniques where helper classes or payloads are compiled and executed in-memory at runtime to evade detection.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects a suspicious sequence where Microsoft Outlook launches Microsoft Edge to open a URL, and that browser process subsequently makes network connections to infrastructure associated with the ClickFix phishing campaign (e.g., rsvpopenh.one or specific malicious IP).
Detects the execution of Node.js or Python interpreters from user-writable directories (AppData/Local) that are executing specific script files. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate scripting languages are leveraged to run unauthorized payloads dropped into the user profile.
This rule detects the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe' from within the '\ProgramData\keyroll\' directory, specifically when it loads 'rnp.dll' from the same path. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, as the ProgramData directory is a common location for adversaries to stage files, and the use of custom DLL loading from this directory may suggest an attempt to execute unauthorized code or obfuscate tool activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious usage of msiexec.exe where the command line contains obfuscation techniques such as excessive spacing, Unicode character substitution, or suspicious case variations. It specifically looks for activity initiated by common shell processes like explorer.exe or cmd.exe that involves the /package argument or URL-based loading, which is a common indicator of MSI-based payload delivery.
Page 103 of 977