Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects instances where a browser or agentic-browser process initiates a file download and subsequently executes that same file within a five-minute window, without the intervention of a user-driven process like explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of automated 'agentic' browser activity, potentially signifying hijacked web instructions or malicious automated tool execution flows.
Detects instances where package management tools (pip, npm, docker) spawn child processes that immediately attempt to read sensitive files (SSH keys, cloud/container credentials) or perform outbound network connections. This behavior is indicative of a trojanized supply-chain package executing malicious post-install logic to exfiltrate secrets or establish initial communication with a C2 server.
Detects anomalous activities within CI/CD runner environments, specifically targeting unauthorized processes attempting to access OIDC identity tokens or executing package publication commands (e.g., npm, twine) outside of standard runner execution workflows. This technique is consistent with supply chain compromise efforts to exfiltrate identity tokens and publish malicious artifacts.
Detects the execution of MicrosoftIME.exe or the creation of scheduled tasks referencing it from non-standard directories such as User, Temp, or AppData folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading or persistence mechanisms where a malicious process mimics the legitimate Microsoft Input Method Editor (IME) binary.
Detects the presence of known Vidar infostealer samples by matching file hashes against a list of identified malicious artifacts. The rule monitors for file creation events, process execution (both as the primary process and as an initiating process), and network activity originating from these known malicious files.
Detects the BotHelper RAT utilizing its msedge_proxy.exe process to execute 'ClipperStart' or 'ClipperStop' commands. These commands are indicative of the malware's clipboard-address substitution functionality, which is used to redirect cryptocurrency transactions by modifying clipboard content.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox, brave) are spawned as child processes by suspicious parent applications or scripting environments such as PowerShell, CMD, WScript, MSHTA, or Office documents (Winword, Excel). This behavior is often indicative of malicious document execution, file-less malware techniques, or drive-by download attempts.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox, brave) are spawned as child processes by suspicious parent applications or scripting environments such as PowerShell, CMD, WScript, MSHTA, or Office documents (Winword, Excel). This behavior is often indicative of malicious document execution, file-less malware techniques, or drive-by download attempts.
Detects the installation of a specific known malicious npm package named 'tw-pkgprobe-7731' via the command line, which may indicate a supply chain compromise or an attempt to execute malicious code within a development environment.
Detects Node.js processes, such as npm package postinstall hooks, spawning shell commands used for host enumeration. This includes accessing system environment variables, network configurations, and filesystem metadata, a pattern frequently utilized by malicious packages for initial reconnaissance post-installation.
Detects the execution of command interpreters or scripting engines spawned by the ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus GINA client process (typically present at the Windows logon screen). This activity is highly suspicious as it indicates potential command injection or abuse of a pre-authentication component running at SYSTEM privileges.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts located in Windows temporary directories (AppData/Local/Temp or Temp) that utilize common evasion flags such as hidden window style, bypass execution policy, or non-interactive mode. This behavior is frequently associated with initial stagers, droppers, or malicious script execution.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns cscript.exe with a VBScript file in the command line. This sequence often indicates an attempt to run obfuscated or malicious scripts using built-in Windows scripting engines, which is a common technique for initial access or execution by adversaries.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that attempt to reassemble a Base64-encoded payload from multiple concatenated variable fragments. It specifically looks for patterns where filler characters ('*' or '?') are stripped from the payload before it is passed to the [Convert]::FromBase64String method. This technique is commonly used to evade static string analysis and signature-based detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell (powershell.exe or powershell_ise.exe) initiated by Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). The rule specifically looks for common obfuscation and stealth flags such as hidden window style, execution policy bypass, and non-interactive mode, which are often used by malicious scripts to execute code silently.
Detects the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) loading suspicious modules such as amsi.dll or clr.dll followed by a process execution involving PowerShell or an unidentified command string, which is indicative of DLL side-loading or process hollowing techniques for malicious code execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands that explicitly perform base64 string decoding using 'FromBase64String'. This pattern is frequently used to obfuscate scripts or payloads, often seen in downloader stagers or malicious scripts to bypass security controls.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe from non-standard locations or utilizing specific exported DLL functions often associated with bypassing application whitelisting, executing scripts, or proxying malicious code execution.
This rule monitors for two potentially suspicious activities on Windows systems: the creation of scheduled tasks named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' or 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore' using 'schtasks.exe', and the execution of scripts via 'wscript.exe' with silent flags ('//B' and '//Nologo'). These behaviors are often associated with persistence mechanisms or the execution of obfuscated/malicious scripts.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender configuration settings, specifically targeting the disabling of real-time monitoring, behavioral monitoring, or other security protections via the Set-MpPreference cmdlet.
This rule detects potential usage of Hidden VNC (hVNC) tools by monitoring for specific command-line arguments (such as 'hvnc-input', 'hvnc-desktop', or 'HVNC_Telegram') and Windows events related to the creation or switching of desktops (e.g., 'CreateDesktop', 'SwitchDesktop'). hVNC is a common technique used by malware to establish a hidden remote desktop session for unauthorized access and control without alerting the user.
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