Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects Node.js or Python processes exhibiting behavior characteristic of information-stealing malware (such as the WaterPlum suite: BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, StoatWaffle). The rule monitors for these processes accessing sensitive files related to browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, scanned identification documents, or performing collection activities like keylogging and screen capturing.
Detects instances where node.exe or npm processes spawn a Python interpreter. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, specifically the execution of second-stage payloads such as the InvisibleFerret backdoor often associated with the BeaverTail JavaScript loader, observed in software supply chain compromise campaigns.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands using '[scriptblock]::Create' in conjunction with character array decoding or large negative integer-array patterns. This technique is commonly used to deobfuscate and execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts at runtime.
Detects the execution of known Canon or Stardock software binaries (COTFileReadApp.exe, DeElevate64.exe) when spawned by msiexec.exe from non-standard locations such as Temp or AppData directories. This pattern is indicative of potential defense evasion, where adversaries leverage legitimate software to proxy execution or potentially perform side-loading activities.
Detects instances where identified RAT-associated or potentially malicious parent processes spawn command-line interpreters (e.g., cmd, powershell) or execute archive management commands, which is indicative of secondary stage payload deployment or automated execution following initial compromise.
Detects network connection attempts to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers from specific binaries identified as host processes for SectopRAT, a malware often associated with ClickFix social engineering campaigns.
Detects the use of PowerShell with a hidden window ('-w hidden') to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' cmdlet to configure Windows Defender exclusions. This combination is often indicative of malicious activity, such as attempting to bypass security controls stealthily following a UAC bypass or initial access.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'psychedelicloveUtils' on Windows systems. This specific task name is associated with the persistence mechanism of the Psychedelic Stealer malware. The detection leverages command-line monitoring for the task creation request and identifies related file-system modifications in the Windows task registry structure.
Detects suspicious execution patterns involving msiexec where a PowerShell process launches or is the parent of an MSI installation occurring from the %TEMP% directory with a GUID-based filename, or when msiexec executes an application from within %AppData%\Local\Programs. This pattern is often associated with fileless malware, ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, or suspicious persistence/installation behavior.
Detects instances of node.exe being spawned by potentially suspicious parent processes like msiexec.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or explorer.exe, or being executed from unusual locations often associated with malicious staging or masquerading, such as Windows Libraries or Themes directories.
This rule detects Terraform CLI execution of the 'init' command correlated with network access to HashiCorp AWS registry domains, or the presence of Terraform lock files in specific sensitive or project-related directory paths. This combination often indicates infrastructure-as-code management activities or potential misuse of Terraform in a production environment.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is executed by a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using common suspicious command-line arguments. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute obfuscated or bypassed PowerShell scripts while attempting to hide or proxy the execution through legitimate scripting host processes.
Detects the execution of regsvcs.exe when initiated by PowerShell, or when invoked with specific command line arguments indicating .NET reflection (GetType, GetMethod, method.Invoke) typically associated with fileless execution or proxying malicious code. The rule specifically targets instances involving .NET Framework directories.
Detects command execution patterns consistent with the ClickFix attack technique, where users are socially engineered into pasting and executing commands (often via the Windows Run dialog or web browsers) to bypass fake CAPTCHA prompts. The rule looks for common living-off-the-land binaries (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, etc.) spawned from browsers or explorer.exe executing suspicious downloader/execution cmdlets.
Detects the use of WScript or CScript to query the Win32_OperatingSystem WMI class for the InstallDate property. This behavior is commonly used by malware to identify the system installation time, which can serve as a simple heuristic for sandbox evasion or environmental keying.
Detects the use of package installation commands (pip, npm, npx) where the package name resembles popular AI/ML libraries (tensorflow, torch, openai, langchain) but is not an exact match for known legitimate versions. This is a common indicator of a typosquatting supply chain attack, where attackers attempt to trick users into installing malicious packages with similar names to trusted software.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects a suspicious sequence of network downloads initiated by bash, sh, or zsh using curl or wget where the command-line includes the 'force=1' parameter. This behavior is indicative of the ClickFix macOS dropper chain often associated with the Macfinger campaign, where multiple payloads (shell scripts and Mach-O binaries) are retrieved from a common C2 infrastructure.
This rule correlates email attachment delivery events with subsequent process creation events on the recipient's endpoint. It identifies scenarios where a known document reader or mail client (Outlook, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Adobe Acrobat/Reader) spawns a suspicious child process (PowerShell, CMD, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Rundll32, or Regsvr32) shortly after a file is delivered via email to the same user. This detects the immediate execution phase of a phishing attack.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects a multi-stage malware execution pattern consistent with VelvetCake activity. This includes staging text-based files in C:\Users\Public, downloading PowerShell scripts to temporary directories, executing the script via PowerShell, and subsequently deleting both the staged text files (except for specific allowed filenames) and the payload script.
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