Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects registry modifications that tamper with internal Windows tools settings, commonly used by malware to disable security features or system tools
Detects PHP script execution interacting with the Microsoft Exchange Web Services (EWS) API, which may indicate web shell usage, email collection, or exfiltration activity.
Detects mshta.exe executing a remote HTA payload over HTTP/HTTPS, the initial fileless execution stage of ACR Stealer's Campaign 2. The retrieved HTA contains VBScript loaders that ultimately deploy obfuscated PowerShell and steganography-assisted in-memory shellcode.
Detects the deployment or creation of containers (via Docker, Podman, Nerdctl, Crictl, or Kubectl) with elevated risk flags such as privileged mode, host namespace sharing, root mounts, docker socket access, or initiated from web application parent processes.
Detects the execution of Wireshark or tshark with command-line arguments indicating TLS key logging or packet capture file handling, followed shortly by a crash handler process (WerFault.exe or WerFaultSecure.exe) for the same process.
The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. We then compare with with a list of known remote access software shipped as a lookup file - remote_access_software. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects creation of a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Hunts for sqlservr.exe spawning command shells or system utilities, a pattern consistent with xp_cmdshell abuse. It also flags later steps from a public intrusion write-up: certutil decoding, SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hive saves and local account or group changes.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device where a shell (/bin/sh, /bin/bash, etc.) is copied to a path involving /usr/bin/dbus-authd using cp or busybox, followed by changing ownership to root, and subsequently setting the SUID permission bit within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
The following analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.
Detects a renamed PSF-signed pythonw.exe (with an original file name of pythonw.exe but a different on-disk name) launched from a user-writable path under Users. The command line consists only of its own path, which is consistent with ._pth based path configuration abuse for loading attacker code stealthily.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects when the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns command-line utilities or script interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe. This behavior often indicates web application exploitation or webshell activity.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading a DLL directly from common browser cache directories (Firefox, Chrome, or Edge), which is indicative of the SensePost cache-smuggling proof-of-concept technique.
Detects Java processes spawning PowerShell or Command Prompt to modify Windows Defender settings by adding exclusions for sensitive paths or extensions (such as AppData, Temp, Users Public, or ProgramData).
Detects potential debugger detection evasion attempts via command line arguments associated with debugging checks or process execution of debugging utilities, as well as persistence configuration using Image File Execution Options (IFEO) or AeDebug registry keys targeting debuggers.
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
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