Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,114
7,174
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,499
11,881
5,887
5,179
4,868
Platforms
18,094
3,056
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,726
4,303
3,716
1,175
958
MITRE Techniques
9,492
7,575
3,460
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
This rule identifies potential infections associated with the MacSync malware family by matching process, file, and network indicators (hashes, malicious domains, and specific payload URLs) against endpoint telemetry. It monitors for execution of known malicious binaries, file creation events, and communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects the execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software on a host shortly after the associated user account underwent a password or MFA reset, a pattern indicative of help-desk impersonation (vishing) followed by unauthorized remote access setup.
Detects the execution of known remote access or remote monitoring software (such as TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or ScreenConnect) on corporate-issued Windows endpoints. The rule triggers on process execution patterns associated with unauthorized remote control, specifically looking for indicators of unattended access or silent installation commonly used by overseas actors to remotely operate company-issued laptops assigned to fraudulently hired identities.
Detects the execution of known remote access or remote monitoring software (such as TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or ScreenConnect) on corporate-issued Windows endpoints. The rule triggers on process execution patterns associated with unauthorized remote control, specifically looking for indicators of unattended access or silent installation commonly used by overseas actors to remotely operate company-issued laptops assigned to fraudulently hired identities.
Detects instances where Microsoft Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) spawns common interpreters or command-line tools (such as node, python, cmd, or powershell) that are not associated with known internal VS Code process behaviors like renderer tasks or tunnel operations. This activity may indicate malicious use of the integrated terminal or extension execution contexts to execute unauthorized code.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the 'endo_voyager_dictation_endpoint' preference key within the 'com.meta.muse.plist' file on macOS. This key is an undocumented configuration setting that, if modified, allows an attacker to redirect dictation traffic to a malicious, attacker-controlled endpoint.
Detects instances where node.exe or npm processes spawn a Python interpreter. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, specifically the execution of second-stage payloads such as the InvisibleFerret backdoor often associated with the BeaverTail JavaScript loader, observed in software supply chain compromise campaigns.
Detects instances where a desktop messaging application (WhatsApp or Telegram) spawns a child process that matches known suspicious naming conventions or lure keywords, suggesting that a user has executed a malicious file shared via the platform.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences by adding exclusion paths, processes, or extensions shortly after the creation of Registry Run keys. This sequence is characteristic of post-exploitation activity where an adversary establishes persistence and subsequently attempts to neutralize security software monitoring of their malicious payloads to avoid detection during future execution.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that utilize hidden window styles and encoded payloads, specifically when the command line or image path references 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to hide malicious scripts and potentially interact with logs in an attempt to masquerade or tamper with Windows Update processes.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies using the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility. This behavior is commonly observed in ransomware attacks, including those attributed to DragonForce and CRPx0, as a method to inhibit system recovery prior to file encryption.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects the execution of multiple distinct host reconnaissance commands (e.g., systeminfo, whoami, ipconfig, AV/EDR checks, and domain enumeration) within a short window (10 minutes) originating from the same parent process. This pattern is characteristic of automated reconnaissance collection, often performed during the initial phases of an attack or as part of a C2 workflow. The rule includes exclusions for common administrative, monitoring, and RMM tools to reduce false positives.
Page 130 of 977