Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
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This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
Detects instances where the AnyDesk remote support application initiates a Windows command shell (cmd.exe) or executes a batch (.bat) file. This behavior is often associated with remote access tools being used to execute arbitrary commands on a target system.
Detects the execution of signed, Microsoft-publisher binaries that are located in typically user-writable or suspicious directories (e.g., AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Users) when initiated by cmd.exe or powershell.exe with an argument indicating a batch file reference. This pattern is indicative of potential masquerading or living-off-the-land techniques where a signed binary is moved or executed from an unconventional location to bypass security controls or execution policies.
This rule monitors for the installation of the 'indexed-btree' JavaScript package via common package managers (npm, yarn, pnpm) or its presence within a 'node_modules' directory. This specific package has been associated with supply chain attacks where malicious code is embedded within dependencies to compromise build systems or environments.
Detects a suspicious Node.js process pattern characterized by the execution of 'sharedLoad.min.js' or detached child processes, followed by rapid outbound network communication to known messaging platforms (Slack, Telegram). This behavior is indicative of the indexed-btree malware family, which exfiltrates host fingerprint data including architecture, hostname, and system metrics.
This rule detects the execution of the Xray proxy utility (xray-core) when launched by the RemoteApp workspace broker process (wkspbroker.exe) or located within the RemoteApp Gateway application data folder. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using proxy tools to facilitate command-and-control communication or network traffic tunneling via trusted remote access infrastructure.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks initiated by the WinGet DSC configuration processes, specifically ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe. This activity is indicative of the abuse of the 'ScheduledTask' resource within a WinGet configuration file to establish persistence via a logon-triggered task.
This rule detects the presence of the malicious indexed-btree npm package by searching for its obfuscated runtime loader triggered via BTree.prototype.set. The malware attempts to spawn a detached Node.js process to execute a secondary payload (sharedLoad.min.js) instead of relying on standard installation scripts, allowing it to maintain persistence and bypass simple static analysis.
Detects the creation of a suspicious scheduled task named 'MicrosoftMusicLibrariesPackageTaskMachine' and the execution of 'codeflush.exe' involving 'settingenv.cat'. These activities are associated with persistence and defense evasion techniques often used by malicious actors.
Detects the creation of a mutex with the 'Global\evolution' prefix, which is a known indicator of the XMRig cryptocurrency miner execution.
Detects instances of MSBuild.exe executing from within the Microsoft.NET framework directory while initiating outbound network connections to a specific known command-and-control (C2) IP address associated with rmrlx infrastructure, or standalone network activity matching these parameters.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects Node.js process executions that involve loading a suspicious JavaScript file named 'sharedLoad.min.js' or 'extended/sharedLoad.min.js'. The rule further flags instances where the process command line includes 'detached' and 'windowsHide' arguments, which are frequently used to execute Node.js scripts in the background without a visible window.
Detects the execution of known remote access and support tools on a host shortly after an email bombing or spam flood alert has been generated for the same user. This pattern is commonly associated with social engineering campaigns where attackers overwhelm a user's inbox to distract them while coercing them into running remote support software to 'resolve' the issue.
Detects instances of MSBuild.exe executing from within the Microsoft.NET framework directory while initiating outbound network connections to a specific known command-and-control (C2) IP address associated with rmrlx infrastructure, or standalone network activity matching these parameters.
Detects instances where curl.exe is spawned by cmd.exe or wscript.exe and uses the -o flag to save downloaded files into user-writable directories (e.g., Temp or AppData), a technique often used to stage secondary payloads during the exploitation process.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from non-standard, user-writable directories (such as Public\Music) or using suspicious filenames. This behavior is indicative of threat actors abusing the Python Embeddable package to run disguised Python backdoors, such as the Chinotto malware family observed in APT37 operations, often staged via batch scripts or curl.
Detects instances where cmd.exe spawns a powershell.exe process with the execution policy set to bypass. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts while bypassing local security restrictions on script execution.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftMusicLibrariesPackageTaskMachine' and the invocation of specific associated file names 'codeflush.exe' or 'settingenv.cat', which are indicators of persistence used by the threat actor APT37.
Detects the copying of the legitimate Windows curl.exe binary from System32 to a user-writable directory (such as AppData\Local\Temp) and renaming it. This is a common LOLBin (Living Off the Land Binary) technique used by adversaries to disguise the utility as a benign application to evade detection while facilitating the download of second-stage payloads.
Detects the presence of zero-width, non-printing, or bidirectional-override Unicode characters in command lines, commonly used for obfuscation or prompt injection.
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