Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule detects command-line activity where a remote resource is downloaded via 'curl', decoded using 'base64', and then piped directly into a shell interpreter (sh, bash, or zsh). This pattern is commonly used in fileless execution or stage-one payload delivery by attackers to execute malicious scripts directly from memory.
Detects instances where the ScreenConnect ClientService process initiates a child process that is not a recognized ScreenConnect binary. It further filters for child processes created shortly after a file has been created or modified by the ScreenConnect service, which is often indicative of an adversary using the remote access tool to drop and execute malicious payloads.
This rule monitors for suspicious process execution (e.g., cmd, powershell) spawned from PaperCut service processes (pc-app.exe, tomcat.exe) followed by a Domain Admin group membership change on the same device within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts following the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-81578/CVE-2026-82078).
Detects instances where the SharePoint IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) initiates command interpreters or known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins). This behavior is characteristic of post-exploitation activity, such as command execution following successful exploitation of SharePoint vulnerabilities involving insecure deserialization or malicious directive injection.
Detects instances where Chrome or Microsoft Edge processes are spawned from suspicious AppData subdirectories that do not match standard installation paths. This behavior is indicative of credential theft malware, such as RevStealer, which launches browser processes as debugged child processes from unique working directories to recover App-Bound encryption keys.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is launched with hidden window arguments by explorer.exe or mshta.exe, and the command line indicates interactions with specific file extensions (.vbs, .ps1) located within the AppData directory. This pattern is often indicative of malicious script execution, such as those used in Konni malware campaigns to drop and execute payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of the VelvetCake variant of the Konni malware. The rule identifies the use of 'Net.WebClient.DownloadString' combined with 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) to execute scripts in memory, alongside specific command-line indicators such as the 'Areyou=cake' campaign marker or associated C2 domains.
Detects the execution of elevated cmd.exe processes (running with High or System integrity) spawned by parent processes originating from the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious installers, droppers, or payload execution where a staged binary in the user profile attempts to perform administrative actions.
Detects the execution of a RevStealer native PE payload by an Electron-based loader (XabivSystem.exe). The rule identifies when the loader spawns an unsigned, detached process from a hidden, randomly-named subdirectory within the user's AppData folder. This process creation is a precursor to the malware's environment checks, anti-VM/sandbox gating, and CAPTCHA verification routines.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage specific tooling for scheduled task enumeration, commonly used for discovery or persistence management. The rule flags usage of 'Get-AccessibleScheduledTask' in conjunction with flags associated with tools like NtObjectManager or OleViewDotNet.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving the enumeration and manipulation of COM objects and .NET assemblies, patterns often associated with reconnaissance or post-exploitation activities. It flags instances where PowerShell scripts utilize specific command-line arguments (e.g., Get-ComDatabase, Get-ComClass, Import-Win32Module, NtObjectManager) in conjunction, suggesting automated discovery of COM infrastructure or assembly loading.
Detects web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera, IE) being spawned by a parent process that is not part of the standard, trusted application launch lineage. This pattern is commonly observed in credential-stealing malware like Vidar Stealer, which invokes browsers to access and exfiltrate stored browser data.
Detects the use of OleViewDotNet or NtObjectManager PowerShell tools to enumerate running COM host processes (e.g., dllhost.exe) and check for the absence of specific security mitigations like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL or COMGLB_UNMARSHALING_POLICY_STRONG. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity aimed at identifying targets for fake-marshaled CoGetInstanceFromIStorage exploit chains.
Detects in-memory modification of the AmsiScanBuffer function within PowerShell processes, specifically targeting the injection of patch instructions (e.g., MOV EAX, 80070057; RET). This technique is characteristic of .NET loaders like PIVOTPIPE attempting to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection before executing malicious payloads.
Detects the GHAPPIER four-stage loader execution chain initiated during npm postinstall processes. This rule monitors for malicious child process spawning (cmd, powershell, curl, wget) by node or npm, as well as the presence of specific markers like the '.git-checker' string or URLs associated with the PolinRider/FAMOUS CHOLLIMA npm supply chain campaign.
This rule detects unauthorized access, creation, or modification of Git credential files (.git-credentials, .netrc) by processes other than standard Git credential management utilities. It also monitors command-line activity that references these credential stores to identify potential attempts to exfiltrate or manipulate stored credentials.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., WebClient, hidden flags, or WebDAV paths) spawned directly from browser processes like chrome.exe or msedge.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with fileless delivery techniques where an attacker attempts to download and execute scripts directly from an internet-facing source.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe with command line arguments containing WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot), which is a common technique used to execute malicious DLLs from remote locations.
Detects instances of explorer.exe being launched by a parent process other than expected system processes (explorer.exe, userinit.exe, or winlogon.exe). This behavior is highly irregular for Windows desktop environments and may indicate process injection or malicious process masquerading.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands intended to gather system information, such as OS details, boot time, or video controller configurations. These techniques are often used during the discovery phase to profile a target machine before further malicious actions.
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