Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper security controls by manually removing the 'com.apple.quarantine' extended attribute using 'xattr' or by modifying executable permissions with 'chmod' on specific system or sensitive file paths, such as 'iSync'. These actions are commonly performed to evade execution restrictions on downloaded or untrusted files.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe where the command line points to a DLL file located on a remote WebDAV share (using the 'davwwwroot' path syntax). This technique is often used to execute malicious payloads while bypassing local disk protections.
Detects the installation of a new kernel-mode service using system utilities like sc.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe, which is a common indicator of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack intended to gain kernel-level privileges.
Detects the execution of known NetSupport Manager remote access tool binaries from locations outside of the official installation directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized use or persistence of remote management software, often used as a RAT by adversaries.
This rule correlates a suspicious process execution (identified by specific command-line indicators), with subsequent persistence modification in Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys, and a subsequent external network connection (excluding internal IP ranges). The activity is captured within a 15-minute window, suggesting a multi-stage attack pattern involving execution, establishing persistence, and initiating C2 communication.
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with suspicious command-line arguments that indicate the loading of remote HTML Applications (HTA) via URLs or inline scripts (javascript/vbscript). This behavior is often indicative of fileless malware execution and living-off-the-land techniques to bypass security controls.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious repository interactions by monitoring 'git' commands executed by common AI-assisted coding tools or command-line developer utilities. It flags occurrences where a checkout operation occurs without accompanying standard git history or status checks, which may indicate automated exfiltration or lateral movement attempt within a developer environment.
Detects evidence of a SharePoint pre-authentication RCE exploit chain where an adversary injects a malicious Namespace containing an ExpandedWrapper-wrapped XamlServices payload (e.g., ObjectDataProvider or LosFormatter gadget) into the w3wp.exe worker process. This specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of deserialization-based exploit attempts targeting SharePoint web server components.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow by identifying suspicious inbound network traffic targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, correlated with subsequent python child processes containing base64 decoding and execution primitives such as eval, exec, or subprocess.
Detects the execution, network connections, and service installation of MeshAgent or associated binaries (e.g., mvtcs.exe). The rule identifies potential unauthorized or malicious use of this remote management software by looking for process activity, specific network connections to known infrastructure, and service persistence mechanisms.
Detects a git checkout to a specific SHA followed by a git rev-parse HEAD verification command within AI coding assistant plugin directories (e.g., claude, codex, copilot, gemini). This pattern is monitored to identify potential supply chain compromises where a working tree might be silently substituted during plugin installation or updates.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating the execution of native Windows utilities used to inhibit system recovery (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) followed by a high volume of file modification events on the same host within a 15-minute window.
Detects two distinct methods of living-off-the-land proxy execution: first, MSBuild.exe spawning network connections after executing inline tasks defined in XML project files; second, Regsvr32.exe performing 'Squiblydoo' execution by loading COM scriptlets from remote URLs.
Detects command-line execution patterns indicative of Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempts. The rule looks for attempts to manipulate internal .NET AmsiUtils fields, modify AmsiScanBuffer, or utilize VirtualProtect against amsi.dll memory regions, all of which are common techniques employed by malicious loaders to evade script-based detection.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable recovery mechanisms. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to inhibit system recovery.
Detects process and file creation activity matching known MovieReaper loader and downstream module file hashes (MD5/SHA256). C2 IP/domain network indicators for this campaign require a separate network_connection-category rule, since Sigma logsource categories cannot be mixed within a single rule.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects Microsoft Exchange Control Panel (ECP) worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) that are commonly associated with the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. This vulnerability involves unsafe deserialization within the Exchange ECP ViewState handling, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
Detects unauthenticated attempts to exploit CVE-2025-3248 in the Langflow 'validate/code' endpoint, characterized by missing authentication headers and the presence of suspicious Base64-encoded payloads or command execution keywords. Additionally, it identifies potential post-exploitation activity where Langflow processes spawn Python subprocesses.
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