Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Detects the presence of the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package, which contains a backdoor that hooks 'BTree.prototype.set' to execute 'sharedLoad.min.js' at runtime. The rule monitors for characteristic file paths, function hooking patterns, and node process spawning behavior designed to evade installation-time static analysis.
Detects creation of a token.cmd file in AppData followed by its execution via cmd.exe within a 5-minute window.
Detects a process that deletes its own executable or script file within a short time window after launch, which is a technique used by some implants.
Detects the execution of the AnyDesk remote support tool while Microsoft Teams is currently running. This pattern is often indicative of social engineering or tech support scams where an attacker convinces a victim to run remote access software during a call.
Detects instances where a parent Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process using a command line structure often associated with malicious npm packages. These packages frequently attempt to execute loader scripts in a detached or background manner to evade detection while maintaining persistence or performing malicious operations.
Detects instances where a Node.js process spawns another Node.js process as a child. This behavior is often associated with malicious npm packages attempting to evade detection during runtime execution or executing secondary malicious payloads.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
Detects instances where a process deletes its own executable or script file within 15 seconds of being launched. This behavior is often associated with self-modifying implants, transient scripts, or malicious artifacts attempting to minimize their footprint on the host system immediately after execution.
This rule detects the execution of AnyDesk within a 30-minute window of Microsoft Teams activity on the same device. This pattern is indicative of a vishing attack, where a malicious actor lures a victim into installing remote access software during a fake technical support session initiated via Teams.
Detects instances where node.js or npm processes spawn child processes that subsequently perform write operations into Windows startup folders or registry run keys within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a second-stage payload execution and persistence mechanism often leveraged by threat actors.
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