Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects the execution of suspected Hidden VNC (HVNC) backdoor components that demonstrate behaviors consistent with banking credential theft, specifically targeting keystroke logging APIs. The rule monitors for specific process names executing from suspicious directories often used for persistence.
Detects the use of common command-line tools (curl, wget, python, etc.) to interact with known cloud provider metadata service IP addresses or URL paths, often performed by shell processes. This behavior is frequently associated with initial reconnaissance or attempts to steal identity tokens from cloud-based virtual machines.
Detects malicious processes associated with the HVNC backdoor (e.g., UpdateAssistant.exe, SysMaintenance.exe) concurrently running alongside identified security product processes on the same device. This behavior suggests the malware is performing automated reconnaissance of installed security software to inform further compromise actions.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to sensitive information by correlating the execution of command-line tools (sed, bash, sh) with secret-related flags or file references, followed shortly by execution of cloud CLI commands that enumerate or retrieve secrets. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to parse or extract sensitive data stored in local configuration files or memory, and then fetching specific secret values from a cloud secret manager.
Detects the execution of known HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) backdoor binaries identified by specific file names and staging directory paths. These binaries are designed to create hidden desktop sessions and perform input injection to facilitate unauthorized remote control of a compromised host.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where an executable with an MD5-formatted name is created in the user's temporary folder, followed by the creation of a registry key with a matching MD5-formatted name in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\ within 15 minutes. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where malware drops a payload in a temp directory and sets a run or autorun registry key to ensure its execution upon logon or startup.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line utilities (cmd.exe, mshta.exe, AutoIt3.exe) using command-line arguments that mimic legitimate service names or security analysis tools (e.g., 'Microsoft Update Superfetch Core Endpoint Service'). This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to mask malicious activity by using strings that resemble benign system services or localized security scanner output, likely for obfuscation or evasion.
Detects execution of common administrative and potentially malicious processes originating from the Microsoft Exchange Server worker process (w3wp.exe). This pattern is indicative of a web shell or post-exploitation activity where an attacker has achieved code execution on an Exchange server.
Detects a variant of the ClickFix technique where an attacker directs a user to open an administrative PowerShell or Command Prompt instance via the Windows+X power user menu through Windows Terminal. This execution chain, involving WindowsTerminal.exe, OpenConsole.exe, and a shell binary, bypasses traditional RunMRU registry artifacts often associated with the standard Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of stealth or obfuscation, such as hidden windows or encoded commands. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious script execution lures, such as JavaScript-based droppers or ClickFix-style campaigns that use PowerShell to stage and execute in-memory payloads.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of stealth or obfuscation, such as hidden windows or encoded commands. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious script execution lures, such as JavaScript-based droppers or ClickFix-style campaigns that use PowerShell to stage and execute in-memory payloads.
Detects PowerShell command lines that simultaneously utilize .NET cryptography classes (TripleDES or AES) for decryption and runspace pipeline creation. This pattern indicates an in-memory execution technique where malicious payloads are decoded and executed directly within the PowerShell process, effectively bypassing disk-based security controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell string concatenation to construct the malicious C2 domain 'merabs.pro'. This technique is used to bypass simple string-based detections that look for the full domain name in command-line arguments.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique where an adversary tricks a user into pasting and executing a malicious command via Windows Explorer (Run dialog) or Windows Terminal. This pattern is often used in fake CAPTCHA or job-interview lures to achieve initial code execution.
Detects parent process ID (PPID) spoofing associated with RMMCRAT and other HVNC malware, where an injected process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) spawns child processes while spoofing explorer.exe as the parent. The rule monitors for a mismatch between the reported parent (explorer.exe) and the actual creator (smartscreen.exe) and focuses on burst activity of common shell and browser processes.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task containing the string 'Google Chrome Update' in the command line, where the task is not the legitimate 'GoogleUpdateTaskMachine' task. The rule specifically targets tasks that execute PowerShell or arbitrary executables, which is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to mask malicious tasks as legitimate software updates.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed with a command line string containing 'Google Chrome Update' and initiates a network connection. This behavior is indicative of a malicious process masquerading as a legitimate browser update mechanism to hide network activity.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that masquerade as a 'Google Chrome Update' task but are initiated by suspicious processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or schtasks.exe, and do not originate from the legitimate Google Chrome installation directories.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects anomalous process execution originating from the PaperCut application server process, specifically targeting the SetupCompleted servlet endpoint. This pattern is indicative of an exploitation attempt, such as CVE-2026-81578, where unauthenticated requests trigger backend server actions before proper access validation.
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