Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,480 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
Detects potential defense evasion activity where Windows Defender configurations are modified or disabled, followed closely within 20 minutes by a silent, quiet, or unattended software uninstallation initiated by a script interpreter or command processor on the same device.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects the AnyDesk Linux service running as root spawning a shell process (sh, bash, dash, zsh) or executing a command associated with the AnyPwn (CVE-2025-27918) post-exploitation behavior.
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function
Detects usage of vssadmin or wmic to delete Volume Shadow Copies
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations to prevent system recovery
before encryption deployment.
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations to prevent system recovery
before encryption deployment.
Detects Chrome or Edge being launched in headless mode with the
remote debugging port flag enabled. msaRAT (Chaos ransomware) uses this to spawn
a hidden browser instance it then manipulates via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP)
to inject JavaScript, hijack browser functionality, and build a covert WebRTC
C2 channel that never touches the network directly from the malware process.
remote debugging port flag enabled. msaRAT (Chaos ransomware) uses this to spawn
a hidden browser instance it then manipulates via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP)
to inject JavaScript, hijack browser functionality, and build a covert WebRTC
C2 channel that never touches the network directly from the malware process.
Detects use of wmic to add Microsoft Defender scan exclusions via the
MSFT_MpPreference WMI class, targeting a program-files path and executable named to
impersonate Windows Defender. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) ran this exact wmic invocation
before deploying the CoolClient backdoor to a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender"
directory, excluding both the folder and the renamed sideloader defender.exe from
scanning.
MSFT_MpPreference WMI class, targeting a program-files path and executable named to
impersonate Windows Defender. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) ran this exact wmic invocation
before deploying the CoolClient backdoor to a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender"
directory, excluding both the folder and the renamed sideloader defender.exe from
scanning.
Detects wmic being used to add a Microsoft Defender exclusion for a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" installation directory. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) runs this command via the MSFT_MpPreference WMI class before dropping the CoolClient sideloader (defender.exe) and libngs.dll into that duplicated folder, ensuring the malware is never scanned. The legitimate Windows Defender path does not contain a "Microsoft\" subfolder, making this exclusion target distinctive.
Detects SSH clients launched with reverse (-R) or dynamic (-D) port
forwarding flags, a hallmark of tunnel establishment used to pivot into internal
networks or expose internal services through a compromised host. The Blinder
Tunnel campaign leverages SSH tunneling to encapsulate C2 and lateral movement
traffic inside an allowed protocol.
forwarding flags, a hallmark of tunnel establishment used to pivot into internal
networks or expose internal services through a compromised host. The Blinder
Tunnel campaign leverages SSH tunneling to encapsulate C2 and lateral movement
traffic inside an allowed protocol.
Detects post-exploitation activity against Ivanti ICS / Connect Secure
appliances on Windows hosts, where a script host (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, w3wp.exe)
drops a web shell (.aspx/.ashx/.asmx) into the appliance WebRoot or reaches into the
CredentialStore / system binaries. These behaviors are the hallmark of attackers
converting an authenticated file-write or SSRF into persistent remote code execution
and credential theft on edge devices.
appliances on Windows hosts, where a script host (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, w3wp.exe)
drops a web shell (.aspx/.ashx/.asmx) into the appliance WebRoot or reaches into the
CredentialStore / system binaries. These behaviors are the hallmark of attackers
converting an authenticated file-write or SSRF into persistent remote code execution
and credential theft on edge devices.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects instances where package managers (pacman, makepkg, yay, paru) or their children spawn a root shell that downloads and executes external scripts via curl or wget.
Detects data staging and exfiltration preceding Play double extortion: WinRAR/RAR adding files to an archive (recursive or password-protected) followed within 4 hours by a WinSCP transfer from the same host and user.
Detects the execution of Linux encryptors or binaries via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), utilizing tools like wsl.exe, wslhost.exe, or bash.exe with execution arguments or referencing ELF files, mount paths, and permission modifications.
Detects the execution of known credential theft tools such as Mimikatz, SharpDecryptPwd, and WebBrowserPassView via EDR process creation telemetry.
Detects PowerShell processes spawned by common managed file transfer (MFT) or web service processes (such as Serv-U, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Tomcat, etc.) performing remote system discovery or ingress tool transfer activities.
Detects schtasks.exe creating a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service" that launches defender.exe (a renamed Sangfor executable abused for DLL sideloading) with SYSTEM privileges at startup. This is the exact persistence mechanism HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) uses to relaunch the CoolClient backdoor chain from the fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" directory on every boot.
Detects the execution of archiving utilities (7z, rar, tar, or Compress-Archive) targeting configuration directories of AI coding assistants such as Claude, Codex, Cursor, and Gemini.
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