Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the execution of staged scripts (.cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js) from user temporary directories using cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is consistent with the Sauron Loader malware family, which utilizes these interpreters to execute secondary C2-tasked payloads.
Detects the execution of staged payloads from the Windows %TEMP% directory. This rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with loader-style C2 execution, including direct execution of randomly named files, proxy execution via rundll32 or regsvr32, silent MSI installations, and the execution of payloads extracted from archives in temporary locations.
Detects the execution of staged payloads from the Windows %TEMP% directory. This rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with loader-style C2 execution, including direct execution of randomly named files, proxy execution via rundll32 or regsvr32, silent MSI installations, and the execution of payloads extracted from archives in temporary locations.
Detects activity associated with the Sauron Loader malware, specifically monitoring for the execution of rnpkeys.exe or loading of tdwp.dll, followed by a high volume of HTTPS POST requests to the same destination host, which is characteristic of chunked screenshot exfiltration.
Detects execution of rnpkeys.exe from the C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ directory, which is indicative of Sauron Loader side-loading activity, followed by an outbound network connection on port 443 within a 5-minute window. This behavior is consistent with the initial bot registration beaconing phase of the malware.
Detects instances where critical system processes (such as svchost.exe, lsass.exe, or w3wp.exe) spawn known command-line interpreters or script execution utilities (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, certutil.exe) which then initiate outbound network connections to common ports (445, 3389, 135, 5985, 5986, 1433, 80, 443) that are external to the local network. This behavior is often associated with lateral movement, command and control (C2) communication, or reconnaissance.
Detects instances where the Steam service (steamservice.exe) is executing suspicious child processes such as command interpreters or binaries located in unusual paths like Temp, Downloads, or AppData, often indicating an attempt to hide malicious activity under a trusted process.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow by identifying suspicious inbound network traffic targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, correlated with subsequent python child processes containing base64 decoding and execution primitives such as eval, exec, or subprocess.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects instances where a process named msedge.exe is running from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This is a common location used by attackers to hide malicious executables by masquerading them as legitimate browser processes, particularly when the process command line includes arguments like 'preview' or 'thumbnail' which are often used to blend in with background system activity.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
Detects process and file creation activity matching known MovieReaper loader and downstream module file hashes (MD5/SHA256). C2 IP/domain network indicators for this campaign require a separate network_connection-category rule, since Sigma logsource categories cannot be mixed within a single rule.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize a combination of 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) and obfuscated strings typical of download cradles. The rule looks for escaped double quotes inside the command line and specific regex patterns that match common obfuscation techniques used to hide malicious URLs or script components.
Detects a suspicious runtime pattern in GitHub Actions where a runner environment installs the Bun runtime and immediately executes an action's index.js file. This pattern is characteristic of supply chain attacks where a compromised GitHub Action uses mutable-tag pinning to smuggle and execute an obfuscated JavaScript payload before legitimate action logic.
Detects the execution of potentially malicious utilities (curl, finger, cmd, powershell) that are launched by the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe). This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity where an adversary uses legitimate OS processes to spawn command shells or network tools for further exploitation or file retrieval.
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