Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,116
7,174
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,501
11,881
5,887
5,179
4,868
Platforms
18,096
3,056
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,727
4,303
3,717
1,175
958
MITRE Techniques
9,493
7,577
3,461
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
Detects evidence of PSNATCH or BASHNATCH tools exfiltrating data to GitHub. The rule identifies suspicious file operations related to an 'SmartUploader' tracking file in standard user directories (AppData, .local/share), monitors for SmartUploader process execution, and flags network connections to api.github.com from processes identified as SmartUploader, bash, or PowerShell.
Detects potential C2 activity associated with MQTTDoor or MatrixDoor malware by monitoring suspicious network traffic patterns. This includes unauthorized processes connecting to MQTT brokers (hivemq.com), non-chat applications interacting with a Matrix homeserver, and geo-location lookups (ip-api.com) occurring shortly after process execution.
Detects the loading or execution of pkexec.so, which is indicative of exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit). This vulnerability allows for local privilege escalation on Linux systems, including within compromised containers.
This rule detects PowerShell processes executing with hidden window styles while performing web-based download operations from GitHub domains. It further identifies potential nested PowerShell execution, which is often used in obfuscated download-and-execute attack chains.
Detects malicious shell commands attempting to perform supply-chain persistence via environment variable manipulation in CI/CD environments. The rule identifies processes injecting BASH_ENV into GITHUB_ENV, a known technique used by the SCKIT supply-chain worm to perform credential harvesting during CI pipeline execution.
Detects the execution of the 'sckit' Go implant, a malicious binary associated with trojanized '@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin' or 'MemoryOS' packages. The rule identifies instances where this binary is spawned as a child process of a language runtime (Node.js or Python) when the execution originates from specific directory paths associated with these packages, or when the parent process command line indicates these packages are being initialized.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain involving communication with known malicious infrastructure ('mnoskemp.beer'), staging and extraction of password-protected archives using '7za.exe' in temporary directories, installation of a spoofed OBS Studio MSI package, and subsequent DLL side-loading of malicious libraries (e.g., 'obs.dll', 'WSql-2.dll') by the 'obs64.exe' process when initiated from outside legitimate installation paths.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit) from the shadow copy. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
Detects the execution or presence of AnyDesk.exe within directories containing 'UBP-Asset' that are outside of known, legitimate installation paths. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to use remote access software for persistent access or command and control, commonly disguised within unconventional directories.
Detects the presence of zero-width, non-printing, or bidirectional-override Unicode characters in command lines, commonly used for obfuscation or prompt injection.
Detects invisible/non-printing Unicode codepoints (zero-width chars, bidi overrides, variation selectors, Unicode tag characters, and Private Use Area icon-font codepoints) embedded in process command lines - covering both classic command/script obfuscation and the emerging use of hidden codepoints to smuggle AI prompt-injection payloads into content later processed by AI copilots/agents. Tightened to require 2+ high-confidence codepoint hits (or 1 from a known scripting host/LOLBin), and gates Private-Use-Area-only matches (a common legitimate icon-font false-positive source) to scripting hosts with 5+ hits, maps to T1027.018.
Detects automated searching (via grep, findstr, or select-string) for sensitive strings (e.g., API keys, private keys, wallet data) across multiple occurrences on a single host, or the creation of suspicious sensitive files (e.g., .env, credentials, wallet.dat) on devices where such automated sweeping activity has been observed. This pattern indicates an adversary staging data for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects a specific pattern associated with the VioletRAT stage-2 loader, where cmd.exe executes a randomly-named batch file from a temporary directory, which subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process designed to download or reflectively load a .NET assembly.
Detects a specific pattern associated with the VioletRAT stage-2 loader, where cmd.exe executes a randomly-named batch file from a temporary directory, which subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process designed to download or reflectively load a .NET assembly.
Detects a specific pattern associated with the VioletRAT stage-2 loader, where cmd.exe executes a randomly-named batch file from a temporary directory, which subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process designed to download or reflectively load a .NET assembly.
Detects anomalous child processes spawned by a Chrome renderer process. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation attempts, such as the BlueMoon exploit kit leveraging CVE-2026-85046, where a compromised renderer attempts to escape the sandbox or execute arbitrary code in the host process.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
Page 155 of 977