Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where Windows scripting engines (WScript or MSHTA) execute script files (WSF, VBS, HTA) which subsequently spawn a PowerShell process using encoded command arguments. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to mask malicious payloads and bypass execution policy or simple command-line monitoring.
Detects anomalous process activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically the execution of 'liblocal-service.so' as a daemon and its use for silent APK reinstallation or monitoring of package paths (via 'pm' commands).
Detects the execution of the 'getevent' utility by a process running with the 'shell' user ID, specifically targeting Android input device nodes. This pattern is indicative of the RatHat malware's AdbTouchCapture module, which is used to monitor touch events to facilitate the unauthorized capture of PINs or pattern locks.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
Detects the installation of Windows services with image paths containing strings associated with known commodity malware or potentially unwanted software (Alinubx, CcProtect, nvfsflt64, NvFsFilter). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms or driver-based malicious components being registered on the host.
Detects the execution of the legacy 'finger.exe' network utility with suspicious command-line arguments. The finger protocol is an outdated service that provides information about users on a system; adversaries may abuse this utility to perform network reconnaissance, identify user accounts, or gather system-level information.
Detects the execution of network utilities like finger.exe or curl.exe (with download parameters) initiated by a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe). This pattern is often used by adversaries for reconnaissance or downloading malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of Python processes where command line arguments indicate the use of the DLLMemLoader agent or related indicators like 'hostfxr' or specific hex strings. This activity is often associated with the loading of malicious DLLs or secondary stages in an attack chain.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
This rule detects instances where mshta.exe acts as a parent process to initiate powershell.exe. It specifically looks for command line arguments that employ obfuscation techniques, such as character casing variations (e.g., 'POWERsHeLl'), while simultaneously excluding standard casing, combined with flags typical of non-interactive execution (e.g., -NonInteractive or /w h /c). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and execute scripts hidden from user view.
This rule detects instances where mshta.exe acts as a parent process to initiate powershell.exe. It specifically looks for command line arguments that employ obfuscation techniques, such as character casing variations (e.g., 'POWERsHeLl'), while simultaneously excluding standard casing, combined with flags typical of non-interactive execution (e.g., -NonInteractive or /w h /c). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and execute scripts hidden from user view.
Detects the use of PowerShell's Start-Sleep cmdlet with a duration of 3 minutes or longer within process command lines. This technique is commonly used by malware, such as ClickFix-style droppers, to bypass sandbox time-based analysis by delaying execution until the sandbox timeout period has elapsed.
Detects the use of PowerShell's Start-Sleep cmdlet with a duration of 3 minutes or longer within process command lines. This technique is commonly used by malware, such as ClickFix-style droppers, to bypass sandbox time-based analysis by delaying execution until the sandbox timeout period has elapsed.
Detects execution chains where explorer.exe (acting as the Run dialog host) spawns suspicious processes like mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe with command lines containing URL indicators (http), common payload filenames (rtdx.dat), or specific IP address strings associated with known ClickFix social-engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
Detects HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE persistence via Run-key registry writes or reg.exe command-line adds, scoped to payloads staged in AppData/ProgramData/Temp/Public/Downloads and excluding legitimate Program Files/System32 targets to reduce false positives from normal software autorun entries.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
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