Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,116
7,174
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,501
11,881
5,887
5,179
4,868
Platforms
18,096
3,056
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,727
4,303
3,717
1,175
958
MITRE Techniques
9,493
7,577
3,461
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
This rule detects the execution of npm or node.js commands involving specific, potentially malicious package names or internal project naming patterns often associated with dependency confusion or supply chain attacks. It monitors npm/node CLI arguments for targeted library names or installation commands that deviate from standard organizational behavior.
This rule detects the execution of npm or node.js commands involving specific, potentially malicious package names or internal project naming patterns often associated with dependency confusion or supply chain attacks. It monitors npm/node CLI arguments for targeted library names or installation commands that deviate from standard organizational behavior.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains or DGA-patterned domains (ending in .icu or .cfd), as well as the execution or file creation of files matching known malicious SHA256 hashes.
Detects anomalous network connections initiated by a node.exe process spawned by npm.exe within 2 minutes of a lifecycle script (preinstall or postinstall) execution. This behavior is indicative of malicious dependency installation where a compromised package attempts to exfiltrate data or fetch additional payloads immediately upon installation.
Detects anomalous network connections initiated by a node.exe process spawned by npm.exe within 2 minutes of a lifecycle script (preinstall or postinstall) execution. This behavior is indicative of malicious dependency installation where a compromised package attempts to exfiltrate data or fetch additional payloads immediately upon installation.
Detects anomalous network connections initiated by a node.exe process spawned by npm.exe within 2 minutes of a lifecycle script (preinstall or postinstall) execution. This behavior is indicative of malicious dependency installation where a compromised package attempts to exfiltrate data or fetch additional payloads immediately upon installation.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the Bazinga macOS backdoor, specifically focusing on the clearing of TCC privacy permissions, the staging of keychain and browser data using 'ditto', and the subsequent exfiltration of this data to a remote host via 'curl'.
Detects indicators of the Bazinga macOS backdoor and Polygon-C2 campaign, including specific command-and-control domains, C2 infrastructure IP addresses, persistence mechanisms via launch agent property lists, and associated cryptographic indicators like file hashes and wallet addresses.
Detects the use of MSBuild.exe to compile and execute inline code or tasks. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns (such as Task/CodeTaskFactory), execution from non-standard directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, etc.), and subsequent network or child process activity originating from these MSBuild instances, indicating potential defense evasion or code execution.
Detects the use of curl to download content from a remote source and pipe the output directly into a shell interpreter (bash, sh) or macOS script interpreter (osascript) for execution.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
This rule monitors endpoint network events, file operations, and process executions for known malicious indicators (domains and file hashes) associated with Kremlin activity. It detects connections to suspicious remote domains and the existence or execution of specific malicious file hashes.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects rapid, multi-category system and network enumeration performed by AI-assisted development tools (e.g., Cursor, Claude, ChatGPT). The rule triggers when an AI agent process performs a comprehensive scan of the host environment, specifically covering machine/OS identity, network configuration, process listings, installed software, and access to sensitive credential files within a 10-minute window. It requires at least 5 distinct discovery categories and 6 total events to reduce noise from routine debugging. Covers T1082, T1016, T1057, T1518
Page 174 of 977