Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the creation of multiple suspicious scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters for specific task names associated with known malicious patterns and XML definition files located in a specific directory path, identifying potential automated persistence or malware installation behavior.
Detects the installation of a potentially malicious root certificate on a host. The rule monitors for common command-line arguments used by 'certutil.exe' to add certificates to the store, use of the 'security' utility for certificate installation on macOS, and the execution of processes referencing 'Localcertificate.zip'.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to execute an external process with elevated privileges using 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs' combined with hidden window flags. The rule specifically looks for evidence that the targeted executable was recently initiated or exists in the context of the PowerShell operation, potentially indicating a UAC bypass attempt or malicious elevation of privileges.
Detects instances where a web browser process (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell (powershell.exe). This pattern is frequently associated with malicious 'ClickFix' or 'fake decryption' social engineering campaigns where users are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands into a terminal.
Detects instances where known NetSupport Manager binaries (client32.exe, netsupportmanager.exe, pcicfgnt.exe) are used to perform persistence-related actions, such as creating a new Windows service, adding a scheduled task, or modifying Run/Winlogon registry keys.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns common command-line or system utilities often used for post-exploitation activities, specifically when command-line arguments contain references to 'MSExchange' or 'Exchange'. This behavior is frequently associated with exploitation attempts against Microsoft Exchange servers, such as the ProxyLogon chain, where a web shell or other malicious script might be used to execute commands via the IIS process.
This rule identifies potential persistence activity on a Windows host by correlating multiple indicators such as service creation, scheduled tasks, registry run key modifications, Winlogon helper modifications, and driver loading. It specifically monitors for indicators associated with 'NetSupport' or 'client32' filenames or services. The rule triggers when two or more distinct persistence mechanisms are detected for the same host and user.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and execute malicious commands in a shell environment. The rule triggers on process execution of terminal or shell binaries (zsh, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing indicators of obfuscated execution or remote code downloading, such as piped shell commands (curl | sh/zsh) or PowerShell encoded command execution.
This rule detects two distinct malicious activities: 1) The presence or execution of files with specific SHA1/SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, identified across file creation, process execution, or as initiating processes. 2) The forced installation of browser extensions in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge by identifying modifications to the 'ExtensionInstallForcelist' registry key.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command-line activity involving the use of encoded, obfuscated, or stealth-focused flags, as well as common patterns associated with fileless payload delivery and execution.
Detects the abuse of the Windows built-in utility 'certutil.exe' to download files or decode obfuscated payloads. Attackers frequently use certutil as a Living off the Land Binary (LOLBin) to bypass security controls by leveraging its native capabilities for file transfer (via URL cache) and base64 or hexadecimal decoding.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download content from an external URL and immediately execute it in memory using common download cradles (e.g., Net.WebClient, IWR) combined with execution commands like IEX (Invoke-Expression). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and post-exploitation activity.
Detects the creation or abuse of Volume Shadow Copies specifically to access the NTDS.dit file or the SYSTEM registry hive, a common technique for offline Active Directory credential dumping.
Detects instances where common Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) spawn child processes that are typically associated with command interpretation, scripting, or LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries). This behavior is often indicative of malicious macro execution, exploit payloads, or obfuscated command execution originating from malicious documents.
Detects instances where AI-assisted development tools (Claude, Codex, Copilot, Gemini) are used to execute git checkout commands. The rule filters for non-interactive parent processes to identify potentially automated or background execution of git operations by these development assistants.
Detects instances where AI-assisted development tools (Claude, Codex, Copilot, Gemini) are used to execute git checkout commands. The rule filters for non-interactive parent processes to identify potentially automated or background execution of git operations by these development assistants.
Detects instances where AI-assisted development tools (such as Claude, Codex, Copilot, or Gemini) initiate command-line processes (e.g., shells, interpreters, or network utilities) with arguments indicative of credential access, reconnaissance, or sensitive file interactions.
Detects the creation or abuse of Volume Shadow Copies specifically to access the NTDS.dit file or the SYSTEM registry hive, a common technique for offline Active Directory credential dumping.
Detects instances where common Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) spawn child processes that are typically associated with command interpretation, scripting, or LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries). This behavior is often indicative of malicious macro execution, exploit payloads, or obfuscated command execution originating from malicious documents.
This rule detects Terraform CLI activity interacting with suspicious domains or modules, specifically targeting known repositories or namespaces (e.g., gocommunity.io, gogets.dev). It monitors for Terraform initialization or application patterns referencing these domains in process command lines, as well as the creation of Terraform provider files within these specific namespaces. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain compromise involving malicious Terraform modules or dependencies.
Detects execution of a specific suspicious executable file masquerading in the Windows Temp directory, coupled with the access of an associated .ini configuration file. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT deployment, often involving initial execution or staging of configuration files within volatile user directories.
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