Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,116
7,174
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,501
11,881
5,887
5,179
4,868
Platforms
18,096
3,056
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,727
4,303
3,717
1,175
958
MITRE Techniques
9,493
7,577
3,461
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable system recovery features. The rule further correlates this activity with preceding mass file activity to identify potential ransomware or destructive attack behavior.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698 that involve suspicious binaries (e.g., powershell, mshta), execution from user-writable directories, or tasks configured to run with SYSTEM privileges, which are common indicators of persistence establishment.
KQL Query
Detects suspicious behavior where an identical executable (same path and SHA256) is launched twice within a short window (60 minutes) following a system reboot, utilizing two distinct persistence methods: one triggered via the Task Scheduler (under svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and one via a user logon autostart mechanism (spawned by explorer.exe).
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
Detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, which is used to add file, folder, or extension exclusions to Microsoft Defender. Attackers frequently use this technique to prevent security software from scanning or detecting malicious files or directories.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior involving the Python interpreter spawning command-line shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe), or interactions (creation/modification) with a specific file at 'C:\ProgramData\ur.txt'. This behavior is often associated with post-exploitation activities, staging, or script-based execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the RatHat Android malware component using getevent or direct access to /dev/input event files to capture user PINs and patterns. The rule filters for processes running under UID 2000 (shell) or identifying as liblocal-service, which are consistent with the malware's keylogging behavior.
Detects the MovieReaper Stage-3 module which masquerades as Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) within the C:\ProgramData\Windows\Telemetry directory. The detection focuses on suspicious process execution from this directory and identifies instances where the process respawns itself, suggesting malicious activity post-UAC bypass.
This rule detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' argument to add specific file or directory paths to Microsoft Defender's exclusion list. This behavior is a common technique used by adversaries to bypass security controls by ensuring malicious tools or scripts are not scanned by Windows Defender. The rule specifically alerts on exclusions related to common staging areas or specific tools such as Telegram Desktop, SSH cache folders, and package management directories.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
This rule detects two suspicious activities: first, the execution of 'conhost.exe' with a headless command line argument containing 'cmd /c echo' and either a '.tmp' file reference or a suspicious base64-like encoded string, initiated by explorer.exe or cmd.exe. Second, it identifies the presence of '.lnk' shortcut files within common user-writable directories such as Downloads, Desktop, or Public folders, which is a common indicator of staging or persistence.
This rule monitors process creation events for suspicious activity, specifically detecting two patterns: 1) The creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive KeepAlive' using schtasks.exe, which is indicative of persistence mechanisms masquerading as legitimate software, and 2) Execution of the 'taskhostw.exe' binary with command-line arguments 'exec' and 'hide', which is a common indicator of the NirCmd utility being renamed and used for stealthy execution.
Detects instances where Windows Terminal (WindowsTerminal.exe) is launched by Explorer and immediately spawns a shell process (PowerShell, PWSH, or CMD), specifically excluding devices that have recorded recent RunMRU registry history. This pattern may indicate suspicious or non-interactive execution by an adversary attempting to bypass traditional shell history tracking.
Detects the use of nodejs.exe to initiate external network tunnels to known tunneling services like pinggy.io or generic tunnels using common tunnel configuration flags.
Detects instances where a process named 'updater.exe' launches another process also named 'updater.exe'. This pattern can indicate suspicious activity where a legitimate updater process is being misused or abused to spawn additional malicious code or side-load components.
This rule monitors for PowerShell commands that combine common data collection flags ('-Recurse', 'Documents') with 'Invoke-WebRequest' to perform a POST method upload. This pattern is commonly associated with the staging and exfiltration of sensitive files from local directories to a remote destination via HTTP/S.
Detects the execution of the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe using specific flags (/logfile=, /LogToConsole=false, and /U) commonly used to execute arbitrary .NET code while bypassing application control mechanisms such as AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC).
Detects the execution of regsvr32.exe with flags indicative of the Squiblydoo technique, which utilizes the /i parameter to load a remote COM scriptlet (.sct file) via scrobj.dll. This method is a known application allowlisting bypass technique.
Detects the execution of odbcconf.exe with the REGSVR action. This technique leverages the legitimate Windows utility odbcconf.exe to load and execute arbitrary DLLs, bypassing security controls that might not monitor or restrict this binary.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious shortcut (.lnk) files or the use of command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) to initiate processes related to specific, potentially malicious filenames often associated with phishing or social engineering campaigns. The rule monitors for these activities occurring in user-writable directories such as Downloads, Desktop, or Temp.
Page 176 of 977