Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
This rule detects the execution of specific suspicious binary names (TempuARKK20.exe, uARKK20.exe) from within temporary directories or their association with command-line arguments involving 'curl.exe' or specific suspicious web hosting strings. This behavior is indicative of malware staging and downloading secondary payloads in an attempt to masquerade as legitimate utilities.
This rule detects various suspicious activities associated with file staging and execution in the C:\Users\Public directory, including the handling of suspicious ZIP archives, renaming of executables (pythonw.exe to userscreen.exe), and the execution of specific batch scripts or obfuscated commands. These behaviors are indicative of an adversary staging tools or persistence mechanisms on a compromised system.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the installation or misconfiguration of GitLab runner executables. It looks for unusual service creation, direct execution of runner binaries from temporary locations (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp), and the presence of configuration files or PowerShell scripts in unexpected directories that might indicate persistent access or unauthorized setup of a build runner.
Detects the installation of a GitLab Runner service on Windows, specifically identifying cases where the service is configured to run under the LocalSystem account. This is monitored via Service Control Manager (Event ID 7045), Sysmon (Registry Event ID 13), and process creation events involving sc.exe or gitlab-runner.exe.
This rule detects instances where common system utilities like notepad.exe or calc.exe are spawned as child processes by PowerShell.exe, specifically when the initiating PowerShell process was spawned by gitlab-runner.exe but the parent process information no longer resolves correctly. This is often indicative of persistence or post-exploitation activities occurring after a CI/CD job has ostensibly finished.
Detects attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper security controls by either removing the quarantine extended attribute or marking a file as executable using 'xattr' or 'chmod'. These techniques are used to allow untrusted or malicious applications to execute without user authorization.
Detects the sequential execution of multiple Microsoft-signed LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) spawned by the same parent process (PowerShell or CMD) within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a cascading fallback mechanism used by post-exploitation tools to bypass application allowlisting or security controls.
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
This rule detects scenarios where an AI agent executes shell commands or system-level tools immediately after receiving a prompt injection attack from an untrusted source. It correlates agent audit logs—specifically identifying tool calls flagged for prompt injection—with actual endpoint process creation events. It flags process execution as 'High' severity if the command line matches common malicious patterns like encoded commands, IEX, or attempts to access credential material (e.g., lsass, mimikatz).
This rule detects scenarios where an AI agent executes shell commands or system-level tools immediately after receiving a prompt injection attack from an untrusted source. It correlates agent audit logs—specifically identifying tool calls flagged for prompt injection—with actual endpoint process creation events. It flags process execution as 'High' severity if the command line matches common malicious patterns like encoded commands, IEX, or attempts to access credential material (e.g., lsass, mimikatz).
This rule detects PowerShell commands that utilize specific character array joining techniques (e.g., [char]nnnn -join '') often used to obfuscate malicious strings or bypass keyword-based security filters. This is a common tactic for evading detection when downloading or executing payloads.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms involving the creation or modification of a specific Windows Registry Run key ('ComponentTask33Agent') within the HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive, or the execution of PowerShell commands targeting this specific registry value. This is indicative of malware, such as the ChainScript Node.js RAT, attempting to maintain access across user reboots by abusing standard Windows autostart configuration points.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms and suspicious execution patterns associated with the ChainScript malware. It specifically monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell with indicators like 'StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1' or 'ComponentTask33Agent', and the execution of VBScript-based agents via wscript.exe. It also flags tasks configured with specific execution time limits often associated with this malware's behavior.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms and suspicious execution patterns associated with the ChainScript malware. It specifically monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell with indicators like 'StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1' or 'ComponentTask33Agent', and the execution of VBScript-based agents via wscript.exe. It also flags tasks configured with specific execution time limits often associated with this malware's behavior.
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
Detects the execution of netscan.exe, a common network scanning tool often used by adversaries to enumerate network resources, hosts, and services within a compromised environment.
Detects DragonForce ransomware behavior where the binary is copied to a staging directory (typically C:\Users\Public\) and subsequently registered as a persistent, one-time execution scheduled task with SYSTEM privileges using COM interfaces or schtasks.exe.
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