Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects when ScreenConnect client processes (ClientService.exe or WindowsClient.exe) spawn child processes that are not part of the standard ScreenConnect application suite. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized use of remote access tools for command execution or lateral movement.
Detects execution of PowerShell or CMD initiated by the Kimsuky GitPower loader. The rule identifies suspicious command-line artifacts including excessive character padding (leading spaces), extremely long command lines, and the presence of a hardcoded, unique base64 decoding variable ('$VIUSBvejbawf') associated with this specific malware family.
Detects instances where an unprivileged user executes commands like 'ls -l' or 'stat' on the Parallels dispatcher Unix socket (/var/run/prl_disp_service.socket) specifically when it is world-writable (mode 0777). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to verify if they can exploit the insecure socket permissions to interact with or hijack the Parallels dispatcher service.
Detects the use of the 'tar' utility with the '--use-compress-program' flag, where the compression program specified is not a standard system compression tool. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute arbitrary payloads when tar extracts malicious archives.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
This rule detects potential attempts to tamper with or bypass Windows Defender by monitoring for files or processes named 'ShieldCrash' occurring in close temporal proximity to the creation or modification of files within Windows Defender's shadow or scan directories (BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\WD_SHADOW_ or WD_SCAN). This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to evade security detection.
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
Detects malicious shell commands attempting to perform supply-chain persistence via environment variable manipulation in CI/CD environments. The rule identifies processes injecting BASH_ENV into GITHUB_ENV, a known technique used by the SCKIT supply-chain worm to perform credential harvesting during CI pipeline execution.
Detects malicious shell commands attempting to perform supply-chain persistence via environment variable manipulation in CI/CD environments. The rule identifies processes injecting BASH_ENV into GITHUB_ENV, a known technique used by the SCKIT supply-chain worm to perform credential harvesting during CI pipeline execution.
Detects the presence or execution of a specific file hash associated with a known malicious campaign (KREMLIN/REF9334) that leverages a signed SentinelOne binary. This indicates potential abuse of trusted code-signing to bypass security controls.
Detects the loading of 'libcurl.dll' or related DLL patterns from suspicious directories such as '\Microsoft\Crypto\RuntimeBroker\', often associated with process masquerading or side-loading activities. The rule also monitors for the execution of suspicious binaries ('Tax_Notice_45594.exe') or binaries that mimic 'Notepad++' metadata from within these paths.
Detects the presence or execution of a specific file hash associated with a known malicious campaign (KREMLIN/REF9334) that leverages a signed SentinelOne binary. This indicates potential abuse of trusted code-signing to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with specific command-line arguments (-NonInteractive, -NoProfile, -Command) often used by the Bird Agent backdoor or similar malicious scripts to execute code silently without user intervention or profile configuration.
Detects suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, java.exe) spawned by the PaperCut NG/MF server processes (pc-app.exe or java.exe), which is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity following remote code execution.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against Microsoft Exchange Server, specifically targeting the ECP (Exchange Control Panel) through VIEWSTATE parameter tampering related to CVE-2020-0688, and correlates this with suspicious behavior in the w3wp.exe process, such as unauthorized module loading (e.g., clr.dll, system.web.dll) and abnormal child process creation which may indicate the deployment of in-memory backdoors like GhostContainer.
Detects the deployment of the GhostContainer backdoor, which masquerades as an IIS server component loaded within w3wp.exe. The rule monitors for command-line arguments associated with web shells and known exploitation tools like reGeorg, indicating an attempt to maintain persistence following an Exchange server compromise.
Detects suspicious process execution spawned by ScreenConnect client processes, which may indicate abuse of remote access sessions for arbitrary command execution. This includes both direct child processes of ScreenConnect client binaries and execution of binaries staged within known ScreenConnect working and temporary directories.
Detects the execution of Mimikatz or the use of specific Mimikatz command-line arguments intended to extract credentials from LSASS memory, a common technique for credential harvesting during post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects suspicious usage of certutil.exe for file downloading or the execution of the Chisel proxy tool, specifically targeting connections or authentication towards the suspicious IP address 69.48.228.86. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication or ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities involving files placed in 'ProgramData\Firefox'. It identifies the creation or modification of a non-standard executable within this folder, followed by its execution by a trusted process (or itself), and the subsequent creation of a Registry run key for persistence. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence mechanism implementation using masqueraded file names.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
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