Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,116
7,174
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,501
11,881
5,887
5,179
4,868
Platforms
18,096
3,056
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,727
4,303
3,717
1,175
958
MITRE Techniques
9,493
7,577
3,461
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3 scripts using mshta.exe as the parent process from suspicious or non-standard directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass application execution policies or obfuscate malicious script execution.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3 scripts using mshta.exe as the parent process from suspicious or non-standard directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass application execution policies or obfuscate malicious script execution.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains or DGA-patterned domains (ending in .icu or .cfd), as well as the execution or file creation of files matching known malicious SHA256 hashes.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity targeting Microsoft Entra Connect (formerly Azure AD Connect) servers. It identifies the execution of known credential harvesting tools like AADInternals or attempts to access/extract the ADSync database files and encryption components. Such actions indicate an attempt to gain unauthorized access to synchronized identities, local domain credentials, or cloud synchronization service accounts.
This rule detects the execution, file creation, or registry modification associated with specific ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) installation artifacts that align with known suspicious deployment patterns. It monitors for binaries and configuration artifacts that may indicate the unauthorized installation or persistence of remote administration tools.
This rule detects the use of 'npm' or 'node' to install packages from a registry other than trusted, standard registries (e.g., npmjs.org, GitHub). It specifically monitors command lines involving 'claude-code' that utilize custom, non-standard registry URLs. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain attacks or the installation of unauthorized/malicious dependencies.
This rule detects the use of 'npm' or 'node' to install packages from a registry other than trusted, standard registries (e.g., npmjs.org, GitHub). It specifically monitors command lines involving 'claude-code' that utilize custom, non-standard registry URLs. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain attacks or the installation of unauthorized/malicious dependencies.
This rule detects the use of 'npm' or 'node' to install packages from a registry other than trusted, standard registries (e.g., npmjs.org, GitHub). It specifically monitors command lines involving 'claude-code' that utilize custom, non-standard registry URLs. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain attacks or the installation of unauthorized/malicious dependencies.
This rule detects the execution of processes associated with CLI proxy routers (such as CLIProxyAPI or router-for-me) that establish network connections to multiple AI provider APIs (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini) within a short window. This pattern is indicative of efforts to bypass rate-limiting or allowlisting mechanisms commonly used by corporate environments to control and audit AI service interactions.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects process executions, file deletions, renames, and movements initiated by known SparroWocky malware files or suspicious DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll). This monitors malicious lifecycle activity on endpoints.
This rule detects potentially malicious system configuration changes, specifically the suspension or disabling of BitLocker drive encryption via 'manage-bde.exe' and the weakening of SChannel security protocols or ciphers by modifying registry keys. These activities are indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass disk encryption or lower the security posture of network communication.
This rule identifies the execution of specific binaries (Kingsoft Office suite and Onkey/Tendyron components) from suspicious or uncommon directories such as temporary folders, user downloads, or public directories, which may indicate the staging and execution of malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate software.
Detects execution chains where explorer.exe (acting as the Run dialog host) spawns suspicious processes like mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe with command lines containing URL indicators (http), common payload filenames (rtdx.dat), or specific IP address strings associated with known ClickFix social-engineering campaigns.
This rule detects instances where mshta.exe acts as a parent process to initiate powershell.exe. It specifically looks for command line arguments that employ obfuscation techniques, such as character casing variations (e.g., 'POWERsHeLl'), while simultaneously excluding standard casing, combined with flags typical of non-interactive execution (e.g., -NonInteractive or /w h /c). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and execute scripts hidden from user view.
Detects the execution of standard Windows command-line utilities (cmd.exe, wmic.exe, powershell.exe, fsutil.exe, vol.exe) used to query local volume information, such as name and serial number. This behavior is frequently associated with environment fingerprinting or sandbox evasion, particularly when executed by suspicious processes like mshta.exe as part of initial infection chains such as ClickFix payloads.
Detects execution chains where explorer.exe (acting as the Run dialog host) spawns suspicious processes like mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe with command lines containing URL indicators (http), common payload filenames (rtdx.dat), or specific IP address strings associated with known ClickFix social-engineering campaigns.
Detects execution of potentially suspicious processes ('Launcher.exe' or 'GapiUpdate.exe') originating from ClickOnce-related processes ('dfsvc.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with 'dfshim.dll'). ClickOnce is often abused to proxy execution of malicious code, allowing adversaries to execute applications from user-writable directories without administrative privileges.
Page 186 of 977