Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow by identifying suspicious inbound network traffic targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, correlated with subsequent python child processes containing base64 decoding and execution primitives such as eval, exec, or subprocess.
Detects rapid, non-interactive ransomware-like behavior characterized by system reconnaissance followed by automated bulk file deletion of model/data files (e.g., .ckpt, .pt). The rule identifies campaigns where discovery, lateral movement or automated execution, and destructive impact occur within a 3-hour window without any interactive user login evidence.
Detects the frequent clearing of specific Windows Event Logs using the built-in wevtutil.exe utility. Attackers often clear logs to hide evidence of post-exploitation activity such as credential access, lateral movement, or persistence installation.
Detects PowerShell command lines that attempt to hide the console window by calling ShowWindowAsync from user32.dll while assigning a randomly generated GUID as the window title. This technique is used to evade detection by keeping malicious PowerShell activity invisible to the user, as seen in recent StealC infostealer loader chains.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the use of the 'wevtutil.exe' command to clear Windows Event Logs where the command specifies a misspelled event log name, 'Microsoft-Windows-Defender/Operational' instead of the correct 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational'. This specific spelling error is associated with the Settra ransomware and indicates an unsuccessful attempt to clear Windows Defender logs.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects instances where explorer.exe spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated execution, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or bypass flags. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks where users are deceived into manually executing malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where explorer.exe spawns cmd.exe or powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated execution, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or bypass flags. This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks where users are deceived into manually executing malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
Detects an AI coding assistant (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini CLI) attempting to checkout a Git repository and subsequently failing a manual verification check (git rev-parse HEAD) against an expected pinned commit hash. This behavior is indicative of a Plugin4Shell-style supply chain attack attempt, where an adversary tries to inject malicious code into a repository that the AI agent is instructed to use.
Detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies directly from memory or via Base64/encoded streams. This technique is commonly used by malicious payloads to execute shellcode, reflection-based attacks, or obfuscated scripts while minimizing their on-disk footprint.
Detects the use of AI assistant command-line interfaces (such as Claude, GitHub Copilot, or Gemini) to execute git checkout commands with specific commit hashes or references like FETCH_HEAD. This behavior may indicate an attempt to use automated AI tooling to stage or interact with repository code, which could be part of an automated exfiltration or unauthorized code modification attempt.
Detects the execution of a local git force-push operation, which is a technique used by an adversary to overwrite existing repository tags or branches during a software supply chain compromise or repository takeover scenario.
Detects the creation of shortcut files (.lnk) within the current user's Startup folder using Windows command line utilities or scripts that leverage the WScript.Shell COM object. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence to ensure malicious payloads execute upon user logon.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands containing indicators of AMSI or ETW unhooking (e.g., references to amsi.dll, AmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, or VirtualProtect). This activity is commonly associated with attackers attempting to bypass endpoint security telemetry and antimalware scanning mechanisms prior to executing malicious payloads.
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