Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

20,501 detections

Detects unauthorized Android Debug Bridge (ADB) commands or modifications to Android system settings that enable Wireless Debugging or Developer Options, originating from non-system applications. This behavior is indicative of malware or malicious actors attempting to maintain persistence or remote access via Android debugging interfaces.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects execution of malicious binaries ('liblocal-service.so', 'frpc', 'local-service.update') or suspicious shell commands on Android devices consistent with the RatHat malware family. The rule monitors for unauthorized APK installations, modification of accessibility service settings, and manipulation of system standby/doze modes via adb or local shell commands.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the execution of suspicious binaries that are spawned by known torrent clients or appear to masquerade as media files (e.g., using movie quality naming conventions like 1080p, Bluray). This rule identifies potential delivery of malicious payloads via P2P file sharing environments by looking for specific process patterns and filename indicators associated with file masquerading.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects malicious Android application activity where an app attempts to enable accessibility services and wireless debugging to perform unauthorized ADB pairing and connection. This technique is associated with the RatHat malware family to bypass sandbox protections and perform self-pairing for ADB access without user interaction.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects execution of a process masquerading as msedge.exe located within the Windows Telemetry directory. This behavior is associated with the MovieReaper malware, specifically as a stage-3 payload activity following UAC bypass and persistence establishment.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
Detects the execution of the rdp2tcp tunneling tool in conjunction with RDP virtual channel activity using the 'rdp2tcp' channel name. This combination is a strong indicator of RDP-based protocol tunneling.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
Detects the execution of the rdp2tcp tunneling tool in conjunction with RDP virtual channel activity using the 'rdp2tcp' channel name. This combination is a strong indicator of RDP-based protocol tunneling.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects the execution of the rdp2tcp tunneling tool in conjunction with RDP virtual channel activity using the 'rdp2tcp' channel name. This combination is a strong indicator of RDP-based protocol tunneling.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the use of the VS Code command line interface to install extensions, specifically by monitoring for the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command. This activity can be indicative of automated installation of extensions, which could be used for malicious purposes or persistence if an attacker installs a malicious extension.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
2 months ago
001
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from code editors (VS Code, Electron-based applications) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or the creation of a specific suspicious file 'EXTINSTALL_PWNED.txt' in the 'Users\Public' directory.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from code editors (VS Code, Electron-based applications) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or the creation of a specific suspicious file 'EXTINSTALL_PWNED.txt' in the 'Users\Public' directory.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension host process launches potentially suspicious child processes, specifically command-line tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or calc.exe, within 30 seconds of the extension host starting.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the installation of Visual Studio Code extensions via the command line interface using the Code.exe process. Adversaries may abuse VS Code extensions to achieve code execution or persistence by installing malicious .vsix files.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the execution of common discovery commands like 'whoami' combined with system information gathering commands (tasklist, ver, uname) when initiated by an application named 'pc-app.exe'. This pattern is frequently observed during the reconnaissance phase of an attack.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
105
Detects the execution of BloodHound/SharpHound reconnaissance tools and the presence of their generated output files (ZIP or JSON format) on a host. This rule monitors both the process creation events associated with the tool's execution and file creation events indicative of data staging or collection output.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
015
Detects the execution of BloodHound/SharpHound reconnaissance tools and the presence of their generated output files (ZIP or JSON format) on a host. This rule monitors both the process creation events associated with the tool's execution and file creation events indicative of data staging or collection output.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
105
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
Detects the execution of MeshCentral remote management agent (meshagent.exe) or activity associated with its default installation paths and markers. MeshCentral is legitimate remote access software that can be abused by adversaries for persistence and command-and-control access.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
003
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