Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,504 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects unauthorized modification of file permissions on Acronis-related files or directories, or modification of Acronis-related files by non-authorized users. This rule targets attempts to weaken file security (e.g., setting permissions to 777 or 666) or unauthorized tampering with Acronis components, which may be part of an attempt to gain persistence, escalate privileges, or evade detection.
Detects the creation or modification of a scheduled task named 'Maps Performance Task' using schtasks.exe or reg.exe. This task is often associated with legitimate Windows system maintenance related to map data but may be monitored as it involves persistence mechanisms.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects the creation of .lnk files in Windows startup folders combined with the execution of AutoIt automation scripts, a technique commonly used for persistence and malware execution.
Detects execution of common reconnaissance and system discovery commands (e.g., whoami, netstat, ifconfig) initiated by web server or application runtime processes (e.g., httpd, nginx, tomcat, node). This behavior is highly indicative of post-exploitation activity where an adversary attempts to gather system or network information after successfully compromising a web-based service.
This rule detects potential attempts to tamper with or bypass Windows Defender by monitoring for files or processes named 'ShieldCrash' occurring in close temporal proximity to the creation or modification of files within Windows Defender's shadow or scan directories (BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\WD_SHADOW_ or WD_SCAN). This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to evade security detection.
This rule detects references to specific social media handles and identifiers associated with the MEK/NCRI (National Council of Resistance of Iran) influence campaign within email URLs, device process command lines, and miscellaneous device events. It is designed to identify potential engagement with or dissemination of influence-related content on endpoints and in email communication.
Detects the execution of the 'su' binary preceded by command-line strings that are highly indicative of known Linux privilege escalation exploits, specifically those targeting vulnerabilities like PwnKit (CVE-2021-4034). The rule monitors for common exploit payloads or status messages (e.g., 'prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE', 'fork userns mapper') associated with successful exploitation attempts that manipulate environment variables or process attributes to elevate privileges to root, while filtering out legitimate container-related processes.
Detects the execution of the 'su' binary preceded by command-line strings that are highly indicative of known Linux privilege escalation exploits, specifically those targeting vulnerabilities like PwnKit (CVE-2021-4034). The rule monitors for common exploit payloads or status messages (e.g., 'prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE', 'fork userns mapper') associated with successful exploitation attempts that manipulate environment variables or process attributes to elevate privileges to root, while filtering out legitimate container-related processes.
Detects the loading of the somkernl.dll module by 360speedld.exe or SoftupNotify.exe, or the execution of these binaries. These files are associated with 360 Safe/360 Security software components, and this rule monitors for their specific activity patterns, which may be used to identify software presence or potential process hollowing/masquerading attempts involving these legitimate components.
Detects the installation or execution of known remote access tools (RMM) from suspicious parent processes (browsers, archives) or from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of initial access and staging activities performed by ransomware operators or Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The rule excludes known IT-managed deployment paths and signed binaries used by the organization.
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
This rule monitors for execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be malicious, and network connections to a known malicious domain associated with Vultr storage. It aggregates file creation, process execution, and network connection events to detect potential threat activity.
This rule detects the execution of a process named 'WhatssApp.exe' from a non-standard location ('C:\ProgramData\Drivers\Whatsapp\'), which is indicative of masquerading. It further correlates this activity with the prior termination of the legitimate 'whatsapp.exe' process within a 30-minute window, a pattern often associated with 'WhatsappCheker' or similar malicious tools designed to hijack legitimate application sessions.
This rule detects the execution of a process named 'WhatssApp.exe' from a non-standard location ('C:\ProgramData\Drivers\Whatsapp\'), which is indicative of masquerading. It further correlates this activity with the prior termination of the legitimate 'whatsapp.exe' process within a 30-minute window, a pattern often associated with 'WhatsappCheker' or similar malicious tools designed to hijack legitimate application sessions.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity by monitoring the execution of Python interpreters or specific suspicious executable names from within the C:\ProgramData directory. The detection logic focuses on processes launching from directories associated with configuration or data storage folders, often used by malware for staging or execution to avoid detection. It specifically flags Python execution involving certain suspicious file or argument strings, and the launch of named executables (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe) located in specific ProgramData subdirectories.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity by monitoring the execution of Python interpreters or specific suspicious executable names from within the C:\ProgramData directory. The detection logic focuses on processes launching from directories associated with configuration or data storage folders, often used by malware for staging or execution to avoid detection. It specifically flags Python execution involving certain suspicious file or argument strings, and the launch of named executables (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe) located in specific ProgramData subdirectories.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity by monitoring the execution of Python interpreters or specific suspicious executable names from within the C:\ProgramData directory. The detection logic focuses on processes launching from directories associated with configuration or data storage folders, often used by malware for staging or execution to avoid detection. It specifically flags Python execution involving certain suspicious file or argument strings, and the launch of named executables (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe) located in specific ProgramData subdirectories.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity by monitoring the execution of Python interpreters or specific suspicious executable names from within the C:\ProgramData directory. The detection logic focuses on processes launching from directories associated with configuration or data storage folders, often used by malware for staging or execution to avoid detection. It specifically flags Python execution involving certain suspicious file or argument strings, and the launch of named executables (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe) located in specific ProgramData subdirectories.
Detects msiexec.exe executing from the Temp directory with suspicious command-line arguments (such as hidden windows) and spawning child processes like cmd.exe, tasklist.exe, or taskkill.exe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious installation scripts attempting to perform discovery or terminate security processes while remaining stealthy.
This rule detects the execution of the SentinelOne memory scanner process (SentinelMemoryScanner.exe) or the loading of the associated SentinelOne core library (SentinelAgentCore.dll) from a directory path outside of the standard SentinelOne installation locations (Program Files\SentinelOne or Program Files (x86)\SentinelOne). This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or tampering where an adversary attempts to execute a renamed or moved security tool to bypass policy or evade detection.
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