Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule detects the use of the VS Code command line interface to install extensions, specifically by monitoring for the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command. This activity can be indicative of automated installation of extensions, which could be used for malicious purposes or persistence if an attacker installs a malicious extension.
Detects execution and file activity associated with the XRed backdoor, which masquerades as 'Synaptics.exe' by running from the non-standard 'C:\ProgramData\Synaptics\' directory instead of authorized system paths.
This rule detects suspicious command executions (e.g., whoami, downloadstring, iex, registry modifications) initiated by processes associated with the CrowdStrike Falcon agent. It also correlates these executions with the loading of unsigned or unverifiable DLLs by the same Falcon processes within a 5-minute window, which may indicate attempts to tamper with or masquerade as the security agent.
Detects instances where LiteLLM, or related Python application processes (uvicorn, python), spawn a shell or command-line utility (bash, sh, id) under the root user account. This behavior is indicative of potential container breakout, application exploitation, or privilege escalation attempts originating from a web-accessible service.
Detects HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE persistence via Run-key registry writes or reg.exe command-line adds, scoped to payloads staged in AppData/ProgramData/Temp/Public/Downloads and excluding legitimate Program Files/System32 targets to reduce false positives from normal software autorun entries.
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell toolkit commands. AADInternals is a known framework used for administration, enumeration, and exploitation of Azure Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, including the creation of backdoors and manipulation of federation settings.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to run an executable named 'wsc_updata.exe' from a temporary directory, or identifies svchost.exe initiating a process from that location. Such behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where malicious actors attempt to run code from unauthorized or writable directories under the context of system processes or scheduled tasks.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to run an executable named 'wsc_updata.exe' from a temporary directory, or identifies svchost.exe initiating a process from that location. Such behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where malicious actors attempt to run code from unauthorized or writable directories under the context of system processes or scheduled tasks.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe referencing a 'Temp.txt' file located within the user's AppData Local Temp directory, which matches a known suspicious file hash. This pattern often indicates an attempt to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via the Windows Installer utility.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe referencing a 'Temp.txt' file located within the user's AppData Local Temp directory, which matches a known suspicious file hash. This pattern often indicates an attempt to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via the Windows Installer utility.
Detects msiexec.exe executing from the Temp directory with suspicious command-line arguments (such as hidden windows) and spawning child processes like cmd.exe, tasklist.exe, or taskkill.exe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious installation scripts attempting to perform discovery or terminate security processes while remaining stealthy.
Detects execution of a specific suspicious executable file masquerading in the Windows Temp directory, coupled with the access of an associated .ini configuration file. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT deployment, often involving initial execution or staging of configuration files within volatile user directories.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
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