Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

20,504 detections

This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms where a suspicious batch file (.bat) is placed within the Windows Startup folder and subsequently executed using command-line arguments that include specific file extensions like .exe and .ini. This behavior is indicative of malware, such as remote access trojans (RATs), attempting to maintain persistence upon system reboot.
avatar
Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects post-exploitation persistence artifacts on Windows endpoints consistent with abuse of CVE-2026-18577.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
006
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects the execution of known development, scripting, and administrative tools (e.g., Python, Node.js, GCC, Docker) from non-standard or unauthorized file paths. The rule leverages allowlists for process names, publishers, and trusted installation directories to identify potentially unauthorized usage of powerful tooling often abused by attackers for post-exploitation activities.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects anomalous activity patterns consistent with automated firmware reverse engineering pipelines, specifically correlating the high-frequency execution of firmware analysis tools (e.g., binwalk, Ghidra) with the creation of vulnerability research knowledge base artifacts. This behavioral heuristic aims to identify potential AI-driven or automated zero-day discovery workflows by tracking tool usage density and output characteristics.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
003
Detects anomalous child processes spawned by a Chrome renderer process. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation attempts, such as the BlueMoon exploit kit leveraging CVE-2026-85046, where a compromised renderer attempts to escape the sandbox or execute arbitrary code in the host process.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
005
Detects instances where multiple executables named 'eld0.exe', 'eld1.exe', or 'eld2.exe' are executed on the same device within a short time window, all containing a 'CID=' argument in the command line. This behavior is often indicative of automated deployment, staging, or modular malware execution patterns.
avatar
Amit Ambekar@Amit007
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
006
Detects the creation of WMI event filters and consumers associated with CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer, excluding known legitimate system processes. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence and executing arbitrary code via WMI event subscriptions.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
104
Detects the creation of WMI event filters and consumers associated with CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer, excluding known legitimate system processes. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence and executing arbitrary code via WMI event subscriptions.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
004
Detects the creation of WMI event filters and consumers associated with CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer, excluding known legitimate system processes. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence and executing arbitrary code via WMI event subscriptions.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
004
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to execute processes, particularly when a remote node target is specified or when using common WMI process creation arguments. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution while attempting to blend into administrative activity. Legitimate management tools have been excluded from the scope to reduce noise.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
604
Detects anomalous system reconnaissance activity performed using WMIC or PowerShell Get-WmiObject commands. The rule tracks distinct command-line executions per device and flags hosts where three or more unique reconnaissance commands are executed within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating system configuration, hotfixes, or hardware details.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
104
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell, or rundll32) spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe shortly after a remote interactive or network logon on the same device.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
004
Detects anomalous child process execution by Chromium-based browsers (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe). This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of browser vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-85046, where a memory corruption vulnerability is leveraged to escape the browser sandbox and execute arbitrary commands via interpreters like cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
708
Detects execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments involving 'DavWWWRoot' and external domains ('pf.ch' or 'verification.google'), which is characteristic of attempts to force remote WebDAV authentication or execute malicious code via network-hosted resources.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
404
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access or large-scale extraction of sensitive RADIUS server configuration and credential databases. It monitors for common database management tools and commands used in conjunction with RADIUS-specific paths, particularly when executed by unexpected processes, during off-hours, or in a manner indicative of bulk data export.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects the execution of MeshCentral remote management agent (meshagent.exe) or activity associated with its default installation paths and markers. MeshCentral is legitimate remote access software that can be abused by adversaries for persistence and command-and-control access.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects the execution of MeshCentral remote management agent (meshagent.exe) or activity associated with its default installation paths and markers. MeshCentral is legitimate remote access software that can be abused by adversaries for persistence and command-and-control access.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects the use of common command-line utilities (grep, find, bash, sh, awk) to search for sensitive files, such as SSH keys, configuration files containing credentials, or password-related patterns. The rule includes exclusions for common administrative, security, and backup tools that might legitimately perform such scans.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Page 232 of 977