Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects execution or file presence of known malicious files based on a pre-defined list of SHA256 hashes associated with known threat activity.
Detects post-exploitation persistence artifacts on Windows endpoints consistent with abuse of CVE-2026-18577.
Detects Python processes (python.exe, pythonw.exe, py.exe) executing with high or system integrity levels and interacting with named pipes, a technique often used for inter-process communication, persistence, or process injection.
Detects anomalous child process execution (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami) by PaperCut application processes (java.exe, pc-app.exe, PCClient.exe), which is indicative of post-exploitation activity following an authentication bypass and remote code execution chain against PaperCut NG/MF.
This rule detects the creation of Windows services with specific, potentially suspicious names (wscl-13, msvcsrvc) configured to start automatically on system startup. The detection logic monitors command-line activity from sc.exe or services.exe to identify these specific service registrations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender Antivirus configurations, specifically adding file exclusions or disabling protection features like Real-time or IOAV monitoring. These actions are common indicators of an adversary attempting to disable security controls to evade detection.
Detects the execution of known Windows update-related binaries (UpdateAssistant.exe or AppUpdateHelper.exe) from non-standard, suspicious locations within AppData directories. This behavior is indicative of masquerading, where an adversary attempts to blend in by using a legitimate process name from an unexpected path.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
Detects multiple methods of tampering with Windows security controls, including disabling Windows SmartScreen via registry, bulk removal of Mark-of-the-Web (Zone.Identifier) via scripting, and disabling driver signature enforcement (TestSigning/NoIntegrityChecks) using BCDedit. These actions are indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass security protections to facilitate the execution of untrusted or malicious code.
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
Detects instances where Acronis processes spawn common administrative or potentially sensitive utilities (such as chmod, chown, bash, or sudo) while running as a user other than root. This behavior may indicate an attempt to utilize Acronis for privilege escalation or unauthorized command execution on Linux systems.
Detects msiexec.exe executing from the Temp directory with suspicious command-line arguments (such as hidden windows) and spawning child processes like cmd.exe, tasklist.exe, or taskkill.exe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious installation scripts attempting to perform discovery or terminate security processes while remaining stealthy.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with removable media (USB drives) by identifying two distinct patterns: first, the creation of an 'autorun.inf' file on a removable drive followed by the execution of a script or executable from that same drive shortly after. Second, it identifies executables appearing on removable media that are launched across multiple distinct hosts within a one-hour window, which may indicate worm-like spreading or mass-malware distribution via portable storage.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task containing 'EdgeCore_AutoUpdate' in the command line using either schtasks.exe or Register-ScheduledTask. This pattern is often indicative of persistence mechanisms attempting to masquerade as legitimate update services.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting volume shadow copies or modifying backup/boot recovery configurations. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit with flags known to facilitate system recovery inhibition, often observed as a precursor to ransomware activity.
Detects anomalous command-line arguments and process injection behaviors associated with the Sogou IME protocol handler (biz_helper.exe). The rule monitors for malicious argument injection (e.g., embedded scripts, URLs pointing to non-Sogou domains) and correlates these events with suspicious child processes or network activity, consistent with techniques observed in the GRAYRABBIT / UNC3569 threat activity.
This rule detects the creation of a .groovy file within a plugin directory related to JFrog Artifactory, followed by the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., shell, curl, wget) by the Artifactory process within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to achieve remote code execution by deploying a malicious plugin.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'GlobalProtectVPNUpdate' using schtasks.exe, which has been identified as a technique used to facilitate the execution of malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate GlobalProtect VPN components. It also monitors for the subsequent execution of 'GlobalProtect.exe' when initiated by Windows background services like taskeng.exe or svchost.exe, which is indicative of persistence and unauthorized code execution.
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