Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,504 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting volume shadow copies or modifying backup/boot recovery configurations. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit with flags known to facilitate system recovery inhibition, often observed as a precursor to ransomware activity.
Detects anomalous command-line arguments and process injection behaviors associated with the Sogou IME protocol handler (biz_helper.exe). The rule monitors for malicious argument injection (e.g., embedded scripts, URLs pointing to non-Sogou domains) and correlates these events with suspicious child processes or network activity, consistent with techniques observed in the GRAYRABBIT / UNC3569 threat activity.
This rule detects the creation of a .groovy file within a plugin directory related to JFrog Artifactory, followed by the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., shell, curl, wget) by the Artifactory process within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to achieve remote code execution by deploying a malicious plugin.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'GlobalProtectVPNUpdate' using schtasks.exe, which has been identified as a technique used to facilitate the execution of malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate GlobalProtect VPN components. It also monitors for the subsequent execution of 'GlobalProtect.exe' when initiated by Windows background services like taskeng.exe or svchost.exe, which is indicative of persistence and unauthorized code execution.
Detects the suspicious execution of cmd.exe with piped stdio handles (indicative of a reverse shell) initiated by non-standard parent processes associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware, correlated with an immediate outbound network connection from the same process.
Detects the suspicious execution of cmd.exe with piped stdio handles (indicative of a reverse shell) initiated by non-standard parent processes associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware, correlated with an immediate outbound network connection from the same process.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
This rule monitors endpoint events (file, process, and image load) for a specific malicious MD5 hash or the presence of a specific file name pattern 'Request for Quotation' often used in malicious lures. It provides visibility into potential execution of known malicious payloads.
Detects potential local privilege escalation via Windows ALPC (Advanced Local Procedure Call) heap-based buffer overflow by identifying a non-SYSTEM Chrome process tree spawning child processes with SYSTEM privileges. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious child binaries or paths characteristic of exploit payloads while excluding legitimate Chrome update and crash handler processes.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events on a Linux host: first, the 'iptables' firewall rules are flushed (-F), followed by the creation of an inbound TCP listener on a high port (>1024) and the activation of that port via iptables, finally correlating this with a network listener process residing in temporary or suspicious directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm. This behavior is indicative of a potential backdoor installation or temporary listener setup for unauthorized access.
Detects rapid, repetitive queries to system hardware identifiers (DMI, CPU info, virtualization attributes) commonly used by adversaries for reconnaissance or environment awareness (sandbox detection). The rule identifies suspicious behavior by tracking the execution of commands like 'cat', 'grep', or 'dmidecode' that target sensitive Linux system files (e.g., /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/*, /proc/cpuinfo) when performed by non-standard parent processes in a short time window.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized process executions (such as shells, network utilities, or enumeration tools) originating from TeamCity server processes (java.exe, javaw.exe). It filters out known TeamCity build agent or maintenance activities to highlight deviations from standard server behavior.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
Detects suspicious activities originating from CrowdStrike Falcon remediation processes (e.g., CSFalconService.exe, CSFalconContainer.exe). The rule identifies two distinct patterns: either a file operation (delete, modify, rename, quarantine, or restore) followed within 2 minutes by the loading of an unsigned or non-standard DLL, or the spawning of an elevated SYSTEM process from a non-SYSTEM parent process. This behavior is indicative of potential LPE (Local Privilege Escalation) abuse via the Falcon remediation engine, often referred to as FalconFlank-style exploitation.
Detects suspicious activities originating from CrowdStrike Falcon remediation processes (e.g., CSFalconService.exe, CSFalconContainer.exe). The rule identifies two distinct patterns: either a file operation (delete, modify, rename, quarantine, or restore) followed within 2 minutes by the loading of an unsigned or non-standard DLL, or the spawning of an elevated SYSTEM process from a non-SYSTEM parent process. This behavior is indicative of potential LPE (Local Privilege Escalation) abuse via the Falcon remediation engine, often referred to as FalconFlank-style exploitation.
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