Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,482 detections
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The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects when the Task Scheduler service ("svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule") spawns common command line, scripting, or shell execution binaries such as "powershell.exe" or "cmd.exe".
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships.
This activity is significant as attackers often abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, blending in with legitimate Windows operations.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships.
This activity is significant as attackers often abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, blending in with legitimate Windows operations.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (shells, interpreters, or system reconnaissance tools) directly spawned by critical Citrix NetScaler service binaries (nsppe, httpd, nsaaad). This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity, such as command injection or lateral movement following the exploitation of a public-facing NetScaler application vulnerability.
Detects instances where Windows Terminal (wt.exe) is used to spawn PowerShell or pwsh as a child process. This pattern may be indicative of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are deceived into pasting or executing malicious commands within a terminal environment.
Detects indicators associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign across process, network connection, DNS, and HTTP telemetry: known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, the chattypetty.com domain, and known payload-hosting URLs.
Detects the creation of persistence mechanisms through both Registry Run keys and Scheduled Tasks within a one-hour window, specifically targeting names indicative of masquerading as legitimate update or helper components.
Detects a shell command referencing a hidden, octal/self-deleting payload
file written to a VMFS datastore volume using a '.sys' filename prefix followed by a
numeric timestamp, combined with an 'rm -f' cleanup of the same file. CrowdStrike observed
this VMFS staging technique used to blend a decoded payload in with legitimate system files
before it is executed and then removed as an anti-forensics step, denying incident
responders a copy of the payload from disk.
file written to a VMFS datastore volume using a '.sys' filename prefix followed by a
numeric timestamp, combined with an 'rm -f' cleanup of the same file. CrowdStrike observed
this VMFS staging technique used to blend a decoded payload in with legitimate system files
before it is executed and then removed as an anti-forensics step, denying incident
responders a copy of the payload from disk.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
Detects the execution of MATCHBOIL malware variants (PlannerAssistantManager.exe or RegularExpressionExplorer.exe) using specific command-line arguments (-auto, -plans, -renew) which trigger C&C logic.
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension
Detects the execution of known tunneling binaries (ngrok, cloudflared) or network connections to tunneling service domains (ngrok.io, ngrok-free.app, trycloudflare.com), which are frequently used to establish unauthorized remote access or bypass perimeter security controls.
The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system.
It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup "is_net_windows_file".
This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Also this analytic leverages a sub-search to enhance performance. sub-searches have limitations on the amount of data they can return. Keep this in mind if you have an extensive list of ransomware note file names.
It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup "is_net_windows_file".
This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Also this analytic leverages a sub-search to enhance performance. sub-searches have limitations on the amount of data they can return. Keep this in mind if you have an extensive list of ransomware note file names.
The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving CertUtil.exe. This activity is significant because attackers often use CertUtil to decode malicious files downloaded from the internet, which are then executed to compromise the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using "wmic" or "Powershell" commands. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes where the command includes "shadowcopy" and "create". This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate or access data in an unauthorized manner, potentially leading to data theft or manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to backup and exfiltrate sensitive data or hide their tracks by restoring files to a previous state after an attack.
The following analytic detects the use of the copy command to dump credentials from a shadow copy. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes with command lines referencing critical files like "sam", "security", "system", and "ntds.dit" in system directories. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to extract credentials, a common technique for unauthorized access and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to attackers gaining sensitive login information, escalating privileges, moving laterally within the network, or accessing sensitive data.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the execution of "mshta.exe" with inline protocol handlers such as "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments and process details. This activity is significant because mshta.exe can be exploited to execute malicious scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic detects the execution of "rundll32.exe" with inline protocol handlers such as "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About". This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it is often associated with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, bypass security controls, and maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.
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