Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,504 detections
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule monitors for the execution or presence of specific file names and SHA256 hashes known to be associated with malicious activity. It queries both process creation and file events to identify these indicators of compromise (IOCs).
This rule monitors for the execution or presence of specific file names and SHA256 hashes known to be associated with malicious activity. It queries both process creation and file events to identify these indicators of compromise (IOCs).
This rule monitors for the execution or presence of specific file names and SHA256 hashes known to be associated with malicious activity. It queries both process creation and file events to identify these indicators of compromise (IOCs).
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
This rule detects the presence of files or process execution events matching a known set of SHA256 hashes associated with the BlueMoon malware family. The detection covers both file system events and process creation events.
This rule detects the presence of files or process execution events matching a known set of SHA256 hashes associated with the BlueMoon malware family. The detection covers both file system events and process creation events.
Detects the PoisonedRefresh implant's UNIX domain socket backdoor by (1) file activity on the uniquely-named /run/bigtlog.pipe socket initiated by an Apache/httpd process, and (2) process command lines containing the implant's hardcoded authentication token. Removed the earlier generic 'bash spawned by httpd' heuristic, which fired on legitimate CGI/mod_php/admin automation that shells out from the web server and was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
This rule detects the creation of a .groovy file within a plugin directory related to JFrog Artifactory, followed by the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., shell, curl, wget) by the Artifactory process within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to achieve remote code execution by deploying a malicious plugin.
Detects the suspicious execution of cmd.exe with piped stdio handles (indicative of a reverse shell) initiated by non-standard parent processes associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware, correlated with an immediate outbound network connection from the same process.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
Detects instances where the GlobalProtect VPN client executable spawns a Windows command shell (cmd.exe). This behavior is highly suspicious as a legitimate VPN client typically does not launch interactive shells, and this pattern has been associated with the execution of malicious payloads such as fake MSI installers.
Detects Node.js or Electron processes executing from suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, Roaming) while interacting with web browser credential files or executing commands consistent with automated credential dumping tools.
Detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving GlobalProtect VPN components. The rule identifies the execution of GlobalProtect.exe with specific command-line arguments combined with the presence of suspicious versions of bcrypt.dll or WININET.dll within the same directory, which are characteristic of recent malicious activity involving modified DLL files targeting GlobalProtect environments.
Detects modifications to Windows LSA and LanmanServer registry keys (RestrictAnonymous, NullSessionPipes) in conjunction with ERAAgent.exe process execution, as well as ERAAgent creating named pipes accessible by anonymous logon, which may indicate configuration tampering to facilitate unauthorized access or credential collection.
Detects anomalous child process execution (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami) by PaperCut application processes (java.exe, pc-app.exe, PCClient.exe), which is indicative of post-exploitation activity following an authentication bypass and remote code execution chain against PaperCut NG/MF.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
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