Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
Detects the starting of the RemoteRegistry service via command-line utilities such as 'sc.exe' or 'net.exe'. This service is often started by adversaries to facilitate remote access to the Windows Registry for reconnaissance or enumeration of logon sessions.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to execute processes, particularly when a remote node target is specified or when using common WMI process creation arguments. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution while attempting to blend into administrative activity. Legitimate management tools have been excluded from the scope to reduce noise.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets such as Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod, Get-CimInstance, or Get-WmiObject to interact with the Win32_Process class for process creation on local or remote systems. This behavior is frequently associated with administrative activity but is also commonly used by adversaries for remote command execution and lateral movement.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (wmiprvse.exe) launches suspicious command-line interfaces or interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, cscript, etc.), or executes scripts from sensitive/temporary directories. The rule includes exclusions for common management tools to reduce noise.
Detects anomalous system reconnaissance activity performed using WMIC or PowerShell Get-WmiObject commands. The rule tracks distinct command-line executions per device and flags hosts where three or more unique reconnaissance commands are executed within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating system configuration, hotfixes, or hardware details.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments involving 'DavWWWRoot' and external domains ('pf.ch' or 'verification.google'), which is characteristic of attempts to force remote WebDAV authentication or execute malicious code via network-hosted resources.
The following analytic detects an unusual process execution pattern where a process running from C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ attempts to execute a binary from C:\Windows\System32\. In a typical Windows environment, 32-bit processes under SysWOW64 should primarily interact with 32-bit binaries within the same directory. However, an execution flow where a 32-bit process spawns a 64-bit binary from System32 can indicate potential process injection, privilege escalation, evasion techniques, or unauthorized execution hijacking.
This rule monitors endpoint events (file, process, and image load) for a specific malicious MD5 hash or the presence of a specific file name pattern 'Request for Quotation' often used in malicious lures. It provides visibility into potential execution of known malicious payloads.
This rule monitors endpoint events (file, process, and image load) for a specific malicious MD5 hash or the presence of a specific file name pattern 'Request for Quotation' often used in malicious lures. It provides visibility into potential execution of known malicious payloads.
Detects instances where Adobe Acrobat or Adobe Reader processes initiate suspicious child processes, such as common interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WScript, CScript) or binaries (rundll32, browser executables) often used in malicious document-based attacks to achieve initial code execution.
This rule detects the Microsoft Edge browser (msedge.exe) being spawned by common productivity applications like Adobe Acrobat or Microsoft Outlook using the '--single-argument' command-line flag. This pattern is frequently used to force a specific browser window to open a malicious URL, which can be an indicator of a malicious document or phishing email attempting to direct the user to a credential harvesting or malware delivery site.
Detects instances where Adobe Acrobat or Adobe Reader processes initiate suspicious child processes, such as common interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WScript, CScript) or binaries (rundll32, browser executables) often used in malicious document-based attacks to achieve initial code execution.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, initiating suspicious WebDAV network connections, dropping executable or sensitive files, or spawning known LOLBAS processes (rundll32, explorer, regsvr32) from suspicious directories like Temp or WebDAV paths. It also includes a blocklist for known malicious file hashes associated with these patterns.
Detects the creation of a Linux named pipe (mkfifo) used in conjunction with netcat (nc) to establish a reverse shell connection to a specific C2 IP address or port 3090. This combination of commands is a common technique used by attackers to achieve remote command execution.
Detects the execution of a Java JAR file (specifically cmd.jar) that is initiated by a shell process (sh). This behavior may indicate an attempt to run malicious Java-based payloads or secondary scripts through a command-line interface.
Detects the creation of a Linux named pipe (mkfifo) used in conjunction with netcat (nc) to establish a reverse shell connection to a specific C2 IP address or port 3090. This combination of commands is a common technique used by attackers to achieve remote command execution.
Detects execution patterns associated with 'NinjaMare' style malware, where a process masquerading as a browser (e.g., tenbrowser.exe, fireflybrowser.exe) performs an external IP geolocation lookup followed by suspicious registry or file modifications indicative of browser hijacking or extension installation within a five-minute window.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
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