Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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1
This rule detects activities related to Tampermonkey (a popular browser extension for userscripts) or interactions with paste.sh, often used for hosting scripts or payloads. The rule monitors both process-level executions and network requests for these indicators, which may be associated with malicious script execution or browser-based credential or session theft.
Detects the execution of processes named 'ProManager.exe' or 'ProManagerServicedc894.exe', which may be indicative of unauthorized software or potentially malicious activity.
Detects the execution of processes named 'ProManager.exe' or 'ProManagerServicedc894.exe', which may be indicative of unauthorized software or potentially malicious activity.
Detects the execution of package managers (pip or npm) to install software dependencies initiated by development or agent-related processes (like IDEs or background services) in a non-interactive session. This behavior can be indicative of automated dependency confusion attacks, malicious supply chain activity, or unauthorized package installation occurring without direct user oversight.
Detects attempts to modify or disable the Windows Update service (wuauserv) using command-line utilities (sc.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in a context involving 'LockAppHost.exe'. This pattern is often associated with unauthorized attempts to tamper with security update mechanisms to prevent system patching.
Detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to disable critical Windows Update or ExploitGuard Malware Removal tasks when initiated by 'LockAppHost.exe'. This behavior is highly irregular, as the LockAppHost process is typically associated with the Windows Lock Screen and should not be modifying security-related scheduled tasks.
Detects malicious network connections, file downloads, or process execution associated with the REVSTEALER malware campaign, which utilizes hijacked YouTube channels to distribute fake game-cheat videos that lure users into downloading 'resightloader.exe' from specific malicious domains.
Detects the loading of registry hives using the 'reg load' command. This technique is often associated with adversary attempts to manipulate the Windows registry, access sensitive data, or establish persistence, particularly when followed by actions executed in the SYSTEM context from the same process lineage.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the task name matches commonly abused names such as 'WinUpdate.exe', 'SoftManager.exe', or 'LockAppHost.exe'. These names are frequently used by adversaries to masquerade as legitimate Windows processes to achieve persistence.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the task name matches commonly abused names such as 'WinUpdate.exe', 'SoftManager.exe', or 'LockAppHost.exe'. These names are frequently used by adversaries to masquerade as legitimate Windows processes to achieve persistence.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands to add directory exclusions to Windows Defender settings. Adversaries often use this technique to exclude directories in 'AppData' from being scanned by antivirus solutions to hide malicious activity, tools, or persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects the use of command-line text-processing utilities (grep, awk, sed, etc.) to search for sensitive credential-related strings (e.g., secret, token, password) within environment files or process environments. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to manually extract stored credentials from configuration files or system environment variables.
Detects suspicious executions of 'nslookup.exe' and 'svchost.exe' when triggered by the Windows LockAppHost process. This pattern is indicative of potential process injection or masquerading attempts by malicious actors using legitimate system processes as proxies for unauthorized activity.
Detects abuse of Tiny-C-Compiler (TinyCC) for shellcode execution, where tcc.exe is renamed to masquerade as svchost.exe and used to compile and execute C source files containing shellcode.
This technique was observed in the Lotus Blossom Chrysalis backdoor campaign, where attackers renamed "tcc.exe" to "svchost.exe", and executed a file named "conf.c" containing Metasploit block_api shellcode with the flags -nostdlib -run.
TinyCC is a legitimate C compiler, but its ability to compile and execute code on-the-fly makes it attractive to attackers seeking to evade detection.
The combination of a renamed compiler binary executing from non-standard locations with suspicious flags is a strong indicator of malicious activity.
This technique was observed in the Lotus Blossom Chrysalis backdoor campaign, where attackers renamed "tcc.exe" to "svchost.exe", and executed a file named "conf.c" containing Metasploit block_api shellcode with the flags -nostdlib -run.
TinyCC is a legitimate C compiler, but its ability to compile and execute code on-the-fly makes it attractive to attackers seeking to evade detection.
The combination of a renamed compiler binary executing from non-standard locations with suspicious flags is a strong indicator of malicious activity.
Detects the execution of known potentially malicious tools cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe with install parameters, or the creation of a Windows service associated with these filenames using sc.exe. This activity is indicative of service-based persistence or malicious software installation.
Detects suspicious service installation patterns involving WmiPrvSE, common in lateral movement techniques.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications related to wscl.exe that mimic persistence mechanisms.
Detects installation of specific suspicious or known helper services, often associated with persistence or proxying.
Detects installation of specific suspicious or known helper services, often associated with persistence or proxying.
Detects the execution of known WinProtector rogueware binaries. These files often present fake 'threat detected' popups to coerce users into paying for fraudulent software and are frequently bundled with other malware, such as Sality.
This rule detects potentially malicious executables associated with Sality malware that consistently launch shortly after system startup across multiple boot sessions. It correlates boot events with process execution events within a 10-minute window post-startup to identify programs exhibiting persistence behavior across at least two separate boot instances.
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